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Introduction

"The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free.... He is
not a knight-errant,roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecratedprinciples."1

Several years before the United States Supreme Court announced for the first time in McNabb v. United States2 its "supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice
in the federal courts,"3 Benjamin Cardozo, then-Chief Judge of
the New York Court of Appeals, reflected, in dicta, upon the nature and scope of this power.4 In People ex rel. Lemon v.
Supreme Court,5 the court affirmed an order prohibiting the
judge in a murder case from requiring the district attorney to
disclose to the defense written statements taken from witnesses
during the investigation. 6 Cardozo went on to assay "the exist1. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDICIL PROCESS 141 (1921).
2. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
3. CARDozo, supra note 1, at 341.
4. The term "supervisory power" has been used by the Supreme Court, lower
federal courts, and state courts, to encompass a broad judicial authority over the
administration of justice. I am using the term to identify this power in the same
fashion that it has been identified by the courts and commentators, notwithstanding criticism that the term is overly simplistic, occasionally misleading, and should
be abandoned. See Sara S. Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal
Cases: Constitutionaland Statutory Limits on the Authority of Federal Courts, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1520 (1984); Alfred Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 214 (1969).

Commentary has centered almost exclusively on the exercise of supervisory
power by the federal courts. See generally Beale, supra; Hill, supra; Murray M.
Schwartz, The Exercise of Supervisory Powerby the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
27 VILL. L. REV. 506 (1982); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term Forward:ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975); James E. Hogan
& Joseph M. Snee, The "McNabb-Mallory"Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47
GEO. L. J. 1 (1958); Note, A Separation of Powers Approach to the Supervisory
Power of the Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. REV. 427 (1982); Note, The Supervisory
Power of the FederalCourts, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1656 (1963). I have been unable to
find in the journals any discussion of the exercise by state courts of a supervisory
power similar to that exercised by federal courts.
5. 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
6. Id. at 28, 156 N.E. at 84.
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ence of an inherent power in courts of criminal jurisdiction to
7
compel the discovery of documents in furtherance of justice."
Finding "glimmerings of such a doctrine" in earlier common law
decisions, 8 but hesitating to "affirm or deny" its existence,9 he
left the battlefield open for some future encounter. He
concluded:
Whether apart from statute and beyond it there is a supervisory
jurisdiction, as yet unplumbed and unexhausted, in respect of
criminal prosecutions, is something that can best be determined
at the call of particular exigencies in the setting of the concrete
instance. The courts are properly reluctant to abjure the power in
advance, or to confine in predetermined formulas the occasions for
its exercise. 10
Whereas the federal courts since McNabb applied supervisory power in hundreds of cases, and in a variety of circumstances," the New York courts have been far more reticent
about invoking, or even formulating, a doctrine of supervisory
jurisdiction. 12 Cardozo was typically prescient in anticipating
this judicial reluctance to recognize a supervisory jurisdiction
over criminal prosecutions. 13 Nevertheless, the New York
courts have in fact exercised a limited supervisory power over
7. Id. at 32, 156 N.E. at 86.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1433.
12. See discussion infra part V. "Jurisdiction is a word of elastic, diverse, and
disparate meanings." Lacks v. Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71, 74, 359 N.E.2d 384, 388, 390
N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (1976) (Breitel, C.J.). The term is used in connection with supervisory authority to denote judicial power in its most basic sense. That is the
sense, I believe, in which Cardozo used the term in Lemon. In this sense, jurisdiction is determined by asking whether a court has the legal power to decide the
issue, and whether the court ought to decide it. See infra notes 75-111 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERAusT No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing
jurisdiction in terms ofjudicial power). But see CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTrrUTION 331-32 (1928) ("It is always important to bear in mind that
there is a vital distinction between a Court's jurisdiction and a Court's power.").
The questions of judicial power and judicial policy are the dominant themes of this
Article.
13. Supervisory power has also been applied in the civil context. See, e.g.,
Sarac v. Bertash, 148 A.D.2d 436, 538 N.Y.S.2d 588 (2d Dep't 1989) (disallowing
testimony of witnesses at trial who failed to appear for depositions); Bankers Trust
Co. v. Braten, 101 Misc. 2d 227, 420 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979)
(assignment of single judge to supervise complex litigation); see also Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946).
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criminal justice and have done so in a manner strikingly similar
to the exercise of their traditional common law power to formu14
late rules of procedure, evidence, and substance.
However, in contrast to the federal courts, the New York
courts have never actually formulated a doctrine of supervisory
jurisdiction, nor have the courts carefully analyzed the principles underlying the exercise of such power. The decisions most
often are guarded, ad hoc, unreasoned, and inconsistent.
This is not surprising. For as the federal cases recognize,
and the much more limited New York variants confirm, supervisory power may be perceived as lacking doctrinal stability and
criticized as an illegitimate form of judicial overreaching. 15 Indeed, the nature of the doctrine itself accounts for the dearth of
legal analysis.
Supervisory power involves a fundamental conflict between
the proper allocation of governmental functions, on the one
hand, and the achievement of justice on the other. 16 Moreover,
as a sub-constitutional common law doctrine designed to enforce civilized standards of procedure and evidence, supervisory
power invokes "the spirit of the Constitution," 7 rather than the
text. As such, it becomes a highly useful weapon in the arsenal
of judicial power, but a highly vulnerable one as well.
This Article discusses the role of supervisory power in the
judicial culture of New York. In order to place supervisory
power in a context, Part II outlines the emergence and decline
of supervisory power in the federal system. Part III then traces
the origin of supervisory power in New York to Cardozo's dictum in Lemon. Part IV explains how supervisory power is an
14. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
15. Much the same criticism is encountered when the Supreme Court interprets the broad language of the Fourteenth Amendment to formulate new constitutional protections. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920, 948-49 (1973). Constitutional theorists would characterize this
exercise of judicial power as "noninterpretavism," in the sense that it authorizes
judges to go beyond the establishment of norms that are clearly stated or implied
in the constitutional text, and seek to enforce norms that cannot be discovered
within that text. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 1 (1980).
16. See discussion infra part V.
17. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 217, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567-68, 386
N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1976).
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aspect of the much broader inherent judicial power, which finds
expression in the familiar common law decision-making process. Part V discusses three principal areas in which supervisory power has been exercised by New York courts since
Cardozo: formulating rules of discovery, regulating grand jury
practice, and fashioning remedies for governmental misconduct.
Finally, Part VI demonstrates that supervisory power is a legitimate exercise of judicial authority based on two distinct theories: as a sub-constitutional common law of justice and fair
dealing, and as an integral part of the court's inherent common
law power to formulate rules for the proper administration of
justice.
II. Rise and Fall of Supervisory Power in the Federal Courts
8 Justice Felix Frankfurter obIn McNabb v. United States,1
served that the federal courts have "the duty of establishing and
maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence" that
are broader in scope than protections afforded by the Constitution or statutes. 19 "In the exercise of its supervisory authority
over the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts," he wrote, judges should be "guided by considerations of
justice not limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance."20 In McNabb and its companion case, Anderson v.
United States,2 ' incriminating statements were obtained by the
police from suspects who were held incommunicado and interrogated for up to several days until some of them confessed. 22
Although there was no proof of coercion, nor any suggestion
that the defendants' constitutional rights were otherwise infringed, the Court held that this prolonged detention was in
"flagrant disregard" of statutory requirements mandating that
a person taken into custody be promptly arraigned before a judicial officer. 23 The Court reversed the convictions based on the
defendants' admissions. 24 To allow a conviction to stand based

18. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
19. Id. at 340-41.
20. Id. at 341.

21. 318 U.S. 350 (1943).
22. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 334-38; Anderson, 318 U.S. at 352-55.
23. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345.
24. Id. at 347.
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on unlawfully secured evidence would make "the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law."25 Thus, the

Court created an exclusionary rule to remedy the government's
misconduct - a defendant's confession would be suppressed if
it was acquired during a period of unreasonable delay between
26
custody and arraignment.
In the fifty years since McNabb, the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts have applied supervisory power in numerous cases. 27 Indeed, the exercise of such power has "become
commonplace in every circuit... ."28 Although the source of this
power and the circumstances justifying judicial intervention are
disputed 29 and barely articulated by the courts, its underlying
rationale traditionally has been understood as twofold - to deter governmental misconduct and to preserve judicial integrity.30 Thus, supervisory power has been invoked by the federal
courts to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence, 31 to regulate
discovery and disclosure of evidence, 32 to prevent abuse of grand
25. Id. at 345. As Professor Hill observed, McNabb was properly the subject
of "judicial law-making in aid of the fair and efficient operation of the judicial process .... " Hill, supra note 4, at 198. The defendants were "poorly educated federal
prisoners, . . . the confessions were the 'crux' of the government's case," and the
conduct of the federal law enforcement officials raised significant doubts as to
whether the confessions were trustworthy. Id. at 197 (citing McNabb, 318 U.S. at
338).
26. McNabb was reaffirmed in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455
(1957) (holding that while certain "[c]ircumstances may justify a brief delay between arrest and arraignment... the delay must not be of a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a confession"). The McNabb-Mallory rule, as it came to
be known, was heavily criticized by law enforcement officials and members of Congress. Most states refused to adopt the rule. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 428-29 (7th ed. 1990).

27. See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187-88, affd on reh'g, 483
F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing 30 such cases).
28. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1456.
29. Compare Beale, supra note 4, at 1520-22 (contending that supervisory
power lacks authority in federal law and that the term should be abandoned) with
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 34-38 (contending that supervisory power is an appropriate form of federal common law).
30. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 n.8 (1980).
31. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960); Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449, 455-56 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347
(1943).
32. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231, 240-41 (1975); Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957).
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jury process and authority,3 3 to oversee summary contempt, 34 to
require fairness in the jury selection process, 35 to mandate
speedy trials, 36 to impose upon prosecutors ethical and professional standards, 37 and to devise sanctions for misconduct by
38
government officials.
However, the federal judicial effort to impose extra-constitutional standards on governmental behavior was controversial
and short-lived; the rise and fall of supervisory power resembles
a parabolic arc, beginning with McNabb, reaching its crest during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren, and then descending
precipitously during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Several
reasons account for the demise of supervisory power in the federal courts. First, supervisory power requires judges to impose
on government officials their own "notions of good policy." 39 The
federal judiciary has resisted this invitation. 40 Second, supervisory power increasingly has been recognized by federal courts
as an unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive domain of a coordinate branch of government, and its exercise a violation of
separation of powers principles. 41 Finally, once supervisory
33. United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761-62 (2d Cir. 1983); United
States -v.Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 885 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d 963, 964 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975); United
States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972).
34. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13-18 (1954).
35. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9 (1976); Marshall v. United States,
360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959).
36. Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d 1345, 1349-51 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 947 (1975).
37. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975); Mesarosh v. United
States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956).
38. United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1214-17 (7th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974).
39. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947).
40. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) (holding that the decisions of lower federal courts concerning law enforcement practices "introduce[ I an
unmanageably subjective standard"); United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088,
1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The supervisory power simply does not give the courts
the authority to make up the rules as they go, imposing limits on the executive
according to whim or will.").
41. Russell, 411 U.S. at 435 ("The execution ofthe federal laws under our Constitution is confided primarily to the Executive Branch of the Government.");
Simpson, 927 F.2d at 1091 ("The doctrine of separation of powers requires judicial
respect for the independence of the prosecutor.").

7

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:41

power became subservient to harmless error analysis,42 this
43
power became largely irrelevant.
One commentator has traced the philosophical basis for supervisory power to the dissenting opinions of Justice Brandeis
in several early entrapment cases." Interestingly, the decline
of supervisory power can be attributed to a more recent entrapment case, United States v. Russell.45 There, the Supreme
Court reinstated a drug conviction that had been reversed by
the court of appeals for excessive governmental involvement in
the crime. 46 Undercover agents had participated in the manufacture of illegal drugs by supplying an essential chemical to
the drug ring.47 Whereas Justice Brandeis saw the judiciary as
having a role to deny aid to governmental lawbreaking 48 "in order to maintain respect for law" and "to preserve the judicial
process from contamination," 49 Justice Rehnquist, in Russell,
warned the federal judiciary against exercising a "'chancellor's
foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not approve."50 Such judicial intervention, Rehnquist commented
pointedly, "unnecessarily introduces an unmanageably subjective standard," and violates the principle of separation of powers. 51 Thus, governmental investigative conduct would be
immune from judicial supervision unless that conduct implicates an independent constitutional right, or "is so outrageous

42. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-56 (1988); United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-12 (1983).
43. The most recent application of supervisory power by the Supreme Court
was Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987), holding that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be
appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action alleging a violation of that order. Id.
at 808-09. The case dealt with a blatant conflict of interest by an attorney and did
not address misconduct by prosecutors generally. Id. at 809-14.
44. Beale, supra note 4, at 1443.
45. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
46. Id. at 436.
47. Id. at 425-26.
48. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,483 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423-24 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
49. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
50. Russell, 411 U.S. at 435.
51. Id.
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that due process principles would absolutely bar the govern52
ment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction."
Federal supervisory power was further eroded in United
States v. Payner,53 where the Court exempted from judicial supervision flagrant governmental illegality that actually violates
individual rights.5 4 Paynerinvolved an admittedly illegal police
search and seizure of documents found in a third party's briefcase that incriminated the defendant. 55 The district court, invoking its supervisory power, held that society's interest in
deterring governmental conduct that "knowingly and purposefully" and in "bad faith hostility" to the Constitution violated a
56
person's rights required suppression of the resulting evidence.
The Supreme Court reversed. 57 Under a Brandeis rational,
sanctioning such behavior "breeds contempt for law," and "declare[s] that in the administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means." 58 The modern Court, however, looked to
other societal values that needed to be accommodated, particularly the interest in presenting reliable evidence of guilt to the
factfinder. 59 Seen in this way, Payner establishes a broad limitation on supervisory power; it subordinates the interests of de52. Id. at 431-432. The Court's opinion cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952), as authority for this rule. Rochin is the seminal case illustrating the
due process limits on law enforcement investigative tactics. In Rochin, the
Supreme Court found that the police officers' use of a stomach pump to force two
capsules of a narcotic drug from the defendant's stomach offended due process. Id.
at 166, 174. The Court, in a classic opinion by Justice Frankfurter, reversed
Rochin's state court conviction, declaring: "This is conduct that shocks the conscience." Id. at 172. In Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), a majority
of the Court would allow a due process defense only in extreme cases of governmental misconduct. Id. at 489-91. The concurring opinion of Justice Powell referred to Judge Henry Friendly's statement that it would be "unthinkable... to
permit government agents to instigate robberies and beatings merely to gather
evidence to convict other members of a gang of hoodlums." Id. at 493 n.4 (Powell,
J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir.
1973)).
53. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
54. Id. at 734-37.
55. Id. at 729-30.
56. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 130, 133-35 (N.D. Ohio 1977),
affd per curiam, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
57. Payner, 447 U.S. at 736-37.
58. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
59. Payner,447 U.S. at 735 ("[S]upervisory power does not authorize a federal
court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized
unlawfully from a third party not before the court.").
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terring illegal conduct and preserving judicial integrity to the
interest in accurate guilt-determinations.
This overriding interest in ensuring accurate judgments
was reaffirmed in two subsequent supervisory power cases United States v. Hasting6° and Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States. 61 In Hasting, the Seventh Circuit reversed kidnapping
convictions on the ground that the prosecutor's summation infringed upon the defendants' Fifth Amendment privileges, in direct violation of repeated and explicit admonitions by the circuit
court against such misconduct. 62 The court of appeals sought to
vindicate the interests that the supervisory power doctrine historically was designed to address - deterring governmental
overreaching and preserving judicial integrity - by refusing to
require a finding of prejudice. 63 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that supervisory power could not be used to censure
governmental misconduct without first determining whether
the defendant was prejudiced by that conduct.6 4 Supervisory
power, in other words, could not trump the harmless error
rule. 65
60. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
61. 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
62. United States v. Hasting, 660 F.2d 301, 303 (7th Cir. 1981).
63. Id.
64. Hasting,461 U.S. at 505-06, 512. The "harmless-error rule... may not be
avoided by an assertion of supervisory power .... " Id. at 505.
65. A federal appellate court following Hasting could not use its supervisory
power prophylactically to reverse a conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct
unless that misconduct was sufficiently harmful that it prejudiced the defendant's
right to a fair trial. Of course, if such misconduct was harmful, there would be no
need to invoke supervisory power in the first place, since the misconduct would
violate the Constitution.
Hasting,however, is not applicable in state proceedings, and some state appellate courts have exercised their supervisory power to reverse convictions for
prosecutorial misconduct that did not necessarily prejudice the defense. See State
v. Fullwood, 484 A.2d 435, 442 (Conn. 1984) ("This court, nonetheless, has supervisory power to vacate a judgment of conviction and to order a new trial to deter
prosecutorial misconduct which, while not so egregious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, is 'unduly offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process.'")
(citations omitted); State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. 1993) ("This
power to reverse prophylactically or in the interests of justice comes from our
power to supervise the trial courts.").
The more common state court approach is expressed in State v. Valdez, 770
P.2d 313, 318 (Ariz. 1989) ("Where there has been misconduct but no error, or the
error is harmless, or when a defendant has failed to object to a nonfundamental
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Bank of Nova Scotia paralleled Hasting, but in the context
of a grand jury proceeding. The district court found that the
prosecutor engaged in serious misconduct that undermined the
grand jury's independence. 66 Using its supervisory authority,
the court dismissed the indictment. 67 Further delimiting the
scope of supervisory power, the Supreme Court ruled that the
lower court had exceeded its power. 68 The Court held that "a
federal court may not invoke supervisory power to circumvent
the harmless-error inquiry .. .69 Consistent with Hasting,the
Court asserted that prejudice to the defendant is the linchpin
for invoking supervisory power, and that absent such harm, no
70
foul would be found.
7
Finally, and most recently, in United States v. Williams, '
the Court ruled that supervisory power could not be invoked to
remedy prosecutorial misconduct that involved withholding
substantial exculpatory evidence from the grand jury.7 2 The
error, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor.") (citations omitted).
The New York courts have not used their supervisory power to reverse convictions prophylactically for prosecutorial misconduct. The courts will reverse convictions based on prosecutorial misconduct only when the misconduct is harmful. See
People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 401, 430 N.E.2d 885, 887-88, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9,
12 (1981). However, the courts' articulation of the standard varies. See People v.
Halm, 81 N.Y.2d 819, 821, 611 N.E.2d 281, 282, 595 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (1993)
(prosecutor's remarks were not prejudicial error); People v. DeJesus, 42 N.Y.2d
519, 369 N.E.2d 752, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1977) (prosecutor's remarks were prejudicial error); People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 109-11, 347 N.E.2d 564, 566-68, 383
N.Y.S.2d 204, 206-208 (1976) (prosecutor's remarks deprived defendant of right to
fair trial); People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256, 260, 247 N.E.2d 651, 653, 299 N.Y.S.2d
830, 833 (1969) (prosecutor's summation "clearly improper" and prejudiced jury);
People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266, 273, 229 N.E.2d 206, 210, 282 N.Y.S.2d 519,
523 (1967) (prosecutor's remarks exceeded fair limits of advocacy and were prejudicial to defendant as a matter of law); People v. Rosa, 108 A.D.2d 531, 489 N.Y.S.2d
722 (1st Dep't 1985) (prosecutor's egregious conduct denied defendant a fair trial).
66. United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1328, 1331, 1336, 1339,
1343 (D. Colo. 1984) (finding that the prosecutor had improperly deputized agents
of the Internal Revenue Service as "agent[s] of the grand jury," flaunted secrecy
provisions, misused grants of immunity, improperly introduced summaries of testimony, mistreated witnesses, and made inflammatory and prejudicial comments).
67. Id. at 1353.
68. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 255.
69. Id. at 254.
70. Id. at 255-56.
71. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
72. Id. at 1745-46. The defendant was investigated by the grand jury for supplying banks with knowingly false financial statements of his current assets for
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Court wrote: "Because the grand jury is an institution separate
from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside, we think it clear that, as a general matter at least, no such
'supervisory' judicial authority exists." 3 Williams broadened
considerably the limitation on supervisory power with respect
to the prosecutor's grand jury conduct fashioned in Bank of
Nova Scotia. The Court in Bank of Nova Scotia assumed that if
the prosecutor's conduct was sufficiently prejudicial, dismissal
of the indictment as a matter of supervisory power would be
warranted. Williams declared that only in those "few" instances where the prosecutor's conduct is circumscribed by specific statutes or rules do courts have any supervisory power to
74
remedy misconduct.
III.

New York's Recognition of Supervisory Power

The proposition that a New York court possesses a power
akin to the federal supervisory power can be traced to People ex
rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court.75 There, an Orange County grand
jury indicted the defendant for poisoning her husband with the
help of an accomplice who had furnished the arsenic.7 6 Provided to the defendant in advance of trial were the transcripts
of the grand jury testimony of: 1) the accomplice who claimed to
have provided the defendant with the poison, 2) the physicians
who had examined the contents of the stomach, and 3) the other
witnesses with respect to cause of death. 77 Not satisfied with
this disclosure, the defendant sought an order from the judge at
Special Term requiring the District Attorney to disclose to the
defense written statements made by various witnesses that
the purpose of obtaining loans. Id. at 1737. The indictment was dismissed because the prosecutor had withheld from the grand jury the defendant's general
ledgers and tax returns, and defendant's testimony in a contemporaneous Chapter
11 bankruptcy proceeding, which evidence purportedly would have demonstrated
that the defendant had not intentionally misled the banks. Id. at 1737-38.
73. Id. at 1742.
74. Id. at 1741.
75. 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
76. Id. at 26, 156 N.E. at 84.
77. Id. at 26-27, 156 N.E. at 84. Such disclosure would not be authorized today. See N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 210.30(3) (McKinney Supp. 1994); see also In re
Jaffe v. Scheinman, 47 N.Y.2d 188, 390 N.E.2d 1165, 417 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1979).
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were taken during interviews with the District Attorney or his
78
assistants.
The order was granted, and it further provided that if the
prosecutor failed to disclose any of the requested items, he
would be "precluded from giving proof on the trial herein of any
facts referred to in any of said documents which he is hereby
directed to file and does not file." 79 The District Attorney
sought a writ of prohibition in the appellate division to prohibit
the lower court from enforcing its discovery order. The appellate
division granted the petition. 80 Permission was granted to allow the Court of Appeals to review the prohibition.8 '
Since an order of prohibition tests the exercise of official
power8 2 - in this case the power of a court to order the prosecutor to disclose in advance of a criminal trial written statements
and reports that he had acquired during the criminal investigation - Cardozo traced the origin and scope of the judicial power
to order inspection and discovery. Common law courts originally lacked any power to order discovery.8 3 To correct this defect, courts of equity intervened by framing for the first time the
78. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 27, 156 N.E. at 84.
79. Id. at 27-28, 156 N.E. at 84.
80. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 218 A.D. 852, 219 N.Y.S. 892 (2d
Dep't 1926).
81. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 28, 156 N.E. at 84.
82. At the time of Lemon, the writ was codified in section 1341 of the Civil
Practice Act. The current version is contained in CPLR Article 78. The writ is a
principal means to test a claim of excessive judicial power. It has been used to
challenge a court's exercise of supervisory power. See In re Holtzman v. Goldman,
71 N.Y.2d 564, 523 N.E.2d 297, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1988): In re State v. King, 36
N.Y.2d 59, 324 N.E.2d 351, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1975); Proskin v. County Court, 30
N.Y.2d 15, 280 N.E.2d 875, 330 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1972). For useful discussions of the
history and scope of the writ, see Harold W. Wolfram, The "Ancientand Just"Writ
of Prohibitionin New York, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1952), and Note, The Writ of
Prohibition in New York - Attempt to Circumscribe an Elusive Concept, 50 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 76 (1975).
83. Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 539 (1911); McQuigan v. Delaware, L. &
W. R.R., 129 N.Y. 50, 54, 29 N.E. 235, 236 (1891). The extent to which the New
York courts relied on English common law is a "particularly complex" subject. See
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMEmcAN LAW 110 (2d ed. 1985). Some
early New York statutes "declared the common law in force," and "re-enacted some
British laws"; other statutes declared that no British statutes should be considered
as laws in New York. Id. The Constitution of 1821 stated that "[sluch parts of the
common law, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New York, as together did form the law of the said colony" on Apr. 19, 1775, and the resolutions of
the colonial Congress, "and of the convention of the State of New York," in force on
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remedies of discovery and inspection.84 These equitable remedies, however, involved a "separate" and "ancillary" lawsuit and
were, therefore, "awkward and unwieldy."85 Accordingly, statutes were enacted as early as 1830 authorizing, to a limited extent, discovery and inspection that the equity courts had
created.86 Despite this legislative "usurpation" of the judicial
prerogative,8 7 the statutory remedies were well received and indeed were expanded in successive codes of civil procedure. 8
Nevertheless, even in civil litigation, the statutory jurisdiction
was limited.89 Documents were not subject to inspection "for
the mere reason that they will be useful in supplying a clew
whereby evidence can be gathered. Documents to be subject to
inspection must be evidence themselves."90
Turning to criminal cases, Cardozo described an "even
more restricted" judicial power. 91 There are opinions that deny
courts any power whatever to order discovery in criminal cases,
Apr. 20, 1777, "would continue to be law, unless altered or repealed, and unless
they were 'repugnant' to the constitution." Id. at 111.
84. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQurry JURISPRUDENCE § 1484 (12th ed.
1877):
One of the defects in the administration of justice in the courts of common
law arises from their want of power to compel a complete discovery of the
material facts in controversy by the oaths of the parties in the suit. And
hence (as we have seen), one of the most important and extensive sources of
the jurisdiction of courts of equity is their power to compel parties, upon
proper proceedings, to make every such discovery.
Id. at 728.
85. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 28, 156 N.E. at 84-85.
86. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. 199, Part III, ch. 1, tit. 3, §§ 21, 22.
87. McQuigan, 129 N.Y. at 55, 29 N.E. at 236.
88. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 28, 156 N.E. at 85; see Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 448,
§§ 342, 803, 1876 (2) N.Y. Laws 1, 152 (repealed 1920); Civil Practice Act, ch. 925,
§ 324, 1920 (4) N.Y. Laws 19, 124 (repealed 1962).
89. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 28-29, 156 N.E. at 85.
90. Id. at 29, 156 N.E. at 85.
91. Id. Cardozo has been criticized for ignoring statutory reforms in midnineteenth England that broadened a defendant's access to discovery materials.
See Robert L. Fletcher, PretrialDiscovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STA. L.
REV. 293, 295 (1960). Statutes allowed defendants the right to be present at preliminary hearings, to cross-examine witnesses, to call witnesses of their own, and
to inspect and receive copies of depositions taken in preliminary hearings. Id. In
addition, no witness could be called at trial unless he was examined at a preliminary hearing. Id. This rule, according to Wigmore, "is required by fairness to an
innocent accused," and "is a question of [judiciall policy, not of [judicial] power." 6
JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1850, at 509 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
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Cardozo observed, while other decisions appear to authorize
92
discovery of documents "that are the subject of the charge."
Still other courts "concede or assume a broader jurisdiction, one
adequate to prevent a failure of justice, yet narrower than discovery in equity or under the statutory substitute."93 However,
even conceding this latter power to order discovery in furtherance of justice, Cardozo stated that "[n]owhere has there been a
suggestion that the jurisdiction can properly be extended to
notes or memoranda in the possession of the prosecutor, but
94
inadmissible as evidence either for prosecution or for defense."
Cardozo buttressed this assertion by citing Rex v. Holland,95 as his "point of departure." 96 Holland, decided by the
King's Bench in 1792, denied a defendant charged with peculation and corruption in East India the opportunity to inspect in
advance of trial a report issued by a British board of inquiry
after it had interviewed witnesses. 97 This report would have
been inadmissible in evidence for the prosecution or defense. 98
Although inspection of the report would have enabled the defendant to better prepare his case for trial, Lord Kenyon rejected out of hand the discovery application:
Nor was such a motion as the present ever made; and if we were
to grant it, it would subvert the whole system of criminal law....
And if we were to assume a discretionary power of granting this
request, it would be dangerous in the extreme, and totally unfounded on precedent. 99
Later cases allowed discovery where the document was the
basis of the charge,10° or itself would have been received in evidence. 10° Cardozo also alluded to two other United States' cases
which suggested that inspection should be granted where "a
92. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 29, 156 N.E. at 85.
93. Id.

94. Id. See 8 JoHN H.

WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE,

§ 2224, at 219-20 (3d ed. Mc-

Naughton rev. 1940).
95. 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (MB. 1792).
96. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 29, 156 N.E. at 85 (citing Rex v. Holland, 100 Eng.
Rep. 1248 (KB. 1792)).
97. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1250.
98. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 30, 156 N.E. at 85.
99. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1249-50.
100. Rex v. Harrie, 172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (N.P. 1833).
101. Regina v. Dorr, 3 Cox Crim. Cas. 221 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1848).
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failure ofjustice may result from its suppression." 10 2 Both cases
involved inspection of physical evidence such as body parts,
weapons or other exhibits in the possession of the prosecutor. 0 3
Cardozo thus recognized a "kinship" between the power to compel inspection "in furtherance of justice" and the "assumption of
04
a supervisory jurisdiction over the acts of public prosecutors."
However, Cardozo noted that there is a danger in reading too
much into this "furtherance of justice" concept, particularly
when it encroaches upon the power of a coordinate branch of
government. 0 5 Distinguishable, Cardozo observed, are cases
that suggest an inherent judicial power to permit inspection of
grand jury minutes, or to compel the service of a bill of
06
particulars.
These decisions reflect remedial devices worked out at common law to correct uncertainties in pleadings; they have no relation to the power to compel the prosecutor to disclose his
proof.10 7 The latter common law power derives from the activities of the Chancellor, "who was careful, none the less, with all
his injunctions and discoveries, to hold aloof from interference
with prosecutions by the Crown." 08 Cardozo further stated:
"The supervisory control, whatever it may be, that belongs to
courts of common law in respect of a criminal prosecution, is an
autochthonous growth, a thing evolving from within. It was not
102. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 30, 156 N.E. at 85 (citing People v. Gerold, 107 N.E.
165 (Ill.
1914) and Commonwealth v. Jordan, 93 N.E. 809 (Mass.), affd, 225 U.S.
167 (1911)).
103. Id.
104. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 30-31, 156 N.E. at 85-86 (citing Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)). In Weeks, the Supreme Court fashioned an exclusionary remedy for violations of the fourth amendment committed by federal law enforcement officers. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. Cardozo may have believed that the
exclusionary rule announced in Weeks was an exercise of supervisory authority. In
a later decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the exclusionary rule of Weeks was
constitutionally-based. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
105. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 31, 156 N.E. at 86. Cardozo was probably expressing
the restrictive American view ofjudicial power, which holds that our judges do not
exercise a power traditionally exercised by English judges of constraining the executive branch by common law rules, subject to the ultimate authority of the legislature. As Professor Hill notes, "Ultimate authority here resides in written
constitutions, which are thought to have settled the prerogatives of the several
branches of the government." Hill, supra note 4, at 208.
106. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 30, 156 N.E. at 85.
107. Id. at 30, 156 N.E. at 85.
108. Id. at 31-32, 156 N.E. at 86.
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forced upon them from without under pressure of the Chancery." 10 9 Cardozo concluded his discussion of supervisory power
with the passage quoted in the introduction.110 Needless to say,
the court affirmed the order of prohibition.'
IV.

Inherent Judicial Power

As the preceding discussion suggests, supervisory power
can be understood as an attribute of a much broader inherent
judicial power. Defining or categorizing this inherent power
has posed for the courts a "vexing problem." 112 Inherent power
finds expression in a variety of areas in which the courts historically have exercised an authority not derived from any written
text, such as a constitution or a statute. 1 3 These areas have
included the power to regulate the practice of law, 114 deal with
matters of court budget, 115 administer courtroom facilities and
109. Id. at 32, 156 N.E. at 86.
110. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
111. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 35, 156 N.E. at 87.
112. In re Kisloff v. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445, 450, 539 N.E.2d 565, 568, 541
N.Y.S.2d 737, 740 (1989); see also Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 451, 489
N.Y.S.2d 914, 920 (2d Dep't 1985) ("[Tlhe inherent power, is, by its very nature,
not susceptible to precise definition.") Historically, inherent power resides only in
New York courts of superior jurisdiction, i.e., courts of record, and not in inferior
courts. Gabrelian,108 A.D.2d at 448 n.1, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 918 n.1. The State Constitution specifically enumerates the courts of record, and authorizes the creation
of "such other courts as the legislature may determine shall be courts of record."
N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 1(b); see N.Y. JuD. LAw § 2 (McKinney 1994) (courts of record
are the court for the trial of impeachments, the court on the judiciary, the court of
appeals, the appellate division of the supreme court, the supreme court, the court
of claims, the county court, the family court, the surrogate's court, the city courts,
the district courts, and the civil and criminal courts of New York City).
113. See sources cited infra notes 114-22.
114. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991); In re Greene, 54
N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981); In re Bar Assoc. of New
York, 222 A.D. 580, 227 N.Y.S. 1 (1st Dep't 1928); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHics § 2.2.1 (1986); Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts
to Regulate the Practice of Law: An HistoricalAnalysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525
(1983). But see AG. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d 1, 503 N.E.2d
681, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1986) (court has no inherent power to impose monetary
sanctions against attorney for frivilous litigation).
115. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of
Inherent Power, 14 PACE L. REv. 111 (1994); Note, JudicialFinancialAutonomy
and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 975 (1972).
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personnel, 116 control court records and files, 1 7 calendar cases
and dismiss actions for nonprosecution," 8 and establish substantive," 9 evidentiary, 120 and procedural' 2' rules to resolve dis116. See State v. Davis, 68 P. 689 (Nev. 1902); In re Spike, 99 Misc. 2d 178,
415 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Yates County Ct. 1979); In re People v. Little, 89 Misc. 2d 742,
392 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Yates County Ct.), affd, 60 A.D.2d 797, 400 N.Y.S.2d 615 (4th
Dep't 1977); In re Courtroom & Offices of Fifth Branch Circuit Court, 134 N.W. 490
(Wis. 1912); Henry M. Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary,21 A.B.A. J.
635 (1935).
117. See Nixon v. Warner Communication, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); In re
Lockett v. Juviler, 65 N.Y.2d 182, 480 N.E.2d 378, 490 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1985); In re
Campbell v. Pesce, 60 N.Y.2d 165, 456 N.E.2d 806, 468 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1983); Dorothy D. v. New York City Prob. Dep't, 49 N.Y.2d 212, 400 N.E.2d 1342, 424 N.Y.S.2d
890 (1980); People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Orange County Court, 271 N.Y. 151, 2
N.E.2d 521 (1936); People ex rel. Doe v. Beaudoin, 102 A.D.2d 359, 478 N.Y.S.2d 84
(3d Dep't 1984).
118. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Grisi v. Shainswit, 119
A.D.2d 418, 507 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1st Dep't 1986); Plachte v. Bancroft, 3 A.D.2d 437,
161 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1st Dep't 1957). But see In re Holtzman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d
564, 523 N.E.2d 297, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1988); Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25
N.Y.2d 237, 250 N.E.2d 690, 303 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1969).
119. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11
(1957) (Fuld, J.):
The rule of nonliability is out of tune with the life about us, at variance with
modern-day needs and with concepts of justice and fair dealing. It should be
discarded. To the suggestion that stare decisis compels us to perpetuate it
until the legislature acts, a ready answer is at hand. It was intended, not to
effect a "petrifying rigidity," but to assure the justice that flows from certainty and stability. If, instead, adherence to precedent offers not justice but
unfairness, not certainty but doubt and confusion, it loses its right to survive, and no principle constrains us to follow it.
Id.; see also Hymowitz v. Lilly Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 507, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941, 947 (1989) ("[Tlhe ever-evolving dictates of justice and fairness,
which are at the heart of our common-law system, require formulation of a remedy
for injuries caused by DES.").
120. Fleury v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334, 341, 200 N.E.2d 550, 554, 251
N.Y.S.2d 647, 653 (1964) (Fuld, J., concurring):
The common law of evidence is constantly being refashioned by the courts of
this and other jurisdictions to meet the demands of modem litigation...
Absent some strong public policy or a clear act of pre-emption by the Legislature, rules of evidence should be fashioned to further, not frustrate, the
truth-finding functions of the courts in civil cases.
Id.; see In re Brown v. Ristich, 36 N.Y.2d 183, 325 N.E.2d 533, 366 N.Y.S.2d 116
(1975) (allowing unsworn testimony to be received in administrative proceedings).
121. Riglander v. Star Co., 98 A.D. 101, 104-05, 90 N.Y.S. 772, 774-75 (1st
Dep't 1904), affd, 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905):
One of the powers which has always been recognized as inherent in courts,
which are protected in their existence, their powers and jurisdiction by constitutional provisions, has been the right to control its order of business and
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putes between parties. 122 This latter aspect of inherent power
is immediately recognizable as the dominant feature of the
traditional common lawmaking process, where courts in the
context of a case or controversy, mold, modify, or discard rules
found to be unsatisfactory, or promulgate new rules when
deemed necessary. 123 The formulation of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules is a familiar, and treacherous, judicial
function. 124 The process is interpretive, interstitial, and incremental. It is admittedly "legislative,"125 but its operation purto so conduct the same that the rights of all suitors before them may be
safeguarded. This power has been recognized as judicial in its nature, and
as being a necessary appendage to a court organized to enforce rights and
redress wrongs ... The courts are not the puppets of the Legislature. They
are an independent branch of the government, as necessary and powerful in
their sphere as either of the other great divisions. And while the Legislature
has the power to alter and regulate the proceedings in law and equity, it can
only exercise such power in that respect as it has heretofore exercised; and it
has never before attempted to deprive the courts of that judicial discretion
which they have always been accustomed to exercise.
Id.
122. See, e.g., Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 A.D. 504, 196 N.Y.S. 43 (1st Dep't 1922),
affd, 235 N.Y. 534, 139 N.E. 724 (1923); Riglander v. Star Co., 98 A.D. 101, 90
N.Y.S. 772 (1st Dep't 1904), affd, 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905); Roscoe
Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599 (1926); Tyrrell Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure, 22 WASH.
L.Q. 459 (1937).
123. The early New York courts, in the absence of a state constitutional Bill of
Rights, employed the common law to protect individual rights. See, e.g., People v.
Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187, 201 (1820) ("the principle [double jeopardy] is a sound and
fundamental one of the common law"). The nature and extent of judicial lawmaking power is one of the classic subjects of legal philosophy. See generally G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); CARDozo, supra note 1;
Charles D. Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1965); Sol Wachtler,
JudicialLawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1990).
124. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 533-34 (1898):
But even without legislation, the judges have great power over the subject,
direct as well as indirect. A system which mainly came into life at their
hands and has been constantly moulded by them, by way of administering
procedure, they can also largely reshape and recast, if they will. But no
court should enter upon this task that is not sure of its ground, that does not
pretty well understand the history, nature, and scope of the existing rules,
and see pretty clearly where it means to come out.
Id.
125. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but
they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular
motions.").

19

60

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:41

portedly is circumscribed by "consecrated principles." 126 The
relationship between judicial and legislative power is a timeless
topic of legal discourse, and a central theme of supervisory
power. 127
It is in relation to this aspect of inherent judicial power the common law adjudicative process - that supervisory power
can be understood as an independent doctrine. 128 As the federal
126. CARDoZO, supra note 1, at 141.
127. Cardozo described that relationship as "conflicted" rather than
cooperative:
Today courts and legislatures work in separation and aloofness. The penalty is paid both in the wasted effort of production and in the lowered quality of the product. On the one side, the judges, left to fight against
anachronism and injustice by the methods ofjudge-made law, are distracted
by the conflicting promptings of justice and logic, of consistency and mercy,
and the output of their labors bears the tokens of the strain. On the other
side, the legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of the needs
and problems of the courts, without expert or responsible or disinterested or
systematic advice as to the workings of one rule or another, patches the
fabric here and there, and mars often when it would mend. Legislature and
courts move on in proud and silent isolation. Some agency must be found to
mediate between them.
Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113, 113-14 (1921).
For a much more recent commentary describing the tension over whether evidence rules should be created by judges or legislators, see Barbara C. Salken, To
Codify or Not to Codify - That is the Question:A Study of New York's Efforts to
Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BRooK L. REV. 641 (1992).
Since 1881, when the New York State Legislature codified criminal procedure,
there has never been any serious movement to abolish or control legislative power
over criminal procedure. See The Rule-Making Power in New York, FirH ANN.
REP. N.Y. Jun. COUNCIL 271, 275 (1939). However, there have been serious efforts
to amend Article VI of the state constitution to limit in civil cases the legislature's
authority "to alter and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and equity
that it has heretofore exercised." Id. Although the legislature possesses the constitutional authority to regulate civil procedure, the legislature is constitutionally
empowered to delegate authority to the courts to regulate practice and procedure.
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 30. An example of such delegation is contained in N.Y. JuD.
LAw § 85 (McKinney 1994) (delegation of rule-making powers to appellate
divisions).
128. It is important to distinguish between inherent power as part of the common law adjudicative process, and inherent power to regulate court-related matters apart from the merits of the lawsuit. The exercise of inherent power in the
latter situation raises concerns similar to the exercise of supervisory power. Thus,
New York courts have invoked inherent power to protect the integrity of judgments. See In re Kisloffv. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445,539 N.E.2d 565, 541 N.Y.S.2d
737 (1989); In re Lockett v. Juviler, 65 N.Y.2d 182, 480 N.E.2d 378, 490 N.Y.S.2d
764 (1985); People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530, 473 N.E.2d 6, 483 N.Y.S.2d 654
(1984). The New York courts have also invoked inherent power to protect the dig-
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cases suggest, 129 supervisory power ordinarily is exercised when
there are gaps in the law' 30 - when neither constitutional,
statutory, nor common law rules exist to cover the particular
case - and where some compelling reason, typically expressed
as justice, fairness, social welfare, or public policy also exists to
persuade the judge to decide the case accordingly.
To be sure, policy considerations animate every judge, and,
in that regard, supervisory power may be no less subjective
than the common law process generally. However, when invoking supervisory power, the judge's authority does not rest upon
any statute or other written declaration of popular will. Nor is
nity of the court. See In re Holtzman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 523 N.E.2d 297,
528 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1988); People v. Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194, 456 N.E.2d 1179, 469
N.Y.S.2d 56 (1983); People v. Wingard, 33 N.Y.2d 192, 306 N.E.2d 402, 351
N.Y.S.2d 385 (1973) (dismissal of information as matter of discretion when neither
prosecutor nor police officer opened for trial).
As with supervisory power, these cases are themselves controversial because
they offer scant analysis and produce few guiding principles. Thus, New York
courts have no inherent power to dismiss an indictment where the prosecutor refuses or is unable to proceed despite admonitions from the court, In re Holtzman v.
Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 523 N.E.2d 297, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1988), to set aside a
verdict of guilty following a bench trial, People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530, 473
N.E.2d 6, 483 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1984), or to vacate after sentence a guilty plea to
correct a mutual mistake byall parties, In re Kisloff v. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445,
539 N.E.2d 565, 541 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1989).
Despite the absence of a statute directly covering the matter, courts in such
cases are found to be exercising a power not specifically conferred by the legislature, acting in an extra-judicial capacity after the case has been terminated, or
usurping the power of a co-equal branch of government. In essence, it is regarded
as bad public policy to allow the inferior courts to exercise the foregoing inherent
powers. See In re Kisloff v. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445, 539 N.E.2d 565, 541
N.Y.S.2d 737 (1989); In re Lockett v. Juviler, 65 N.Y.2d 182, 480 N.E.2d 378, 490
N.Y.S.2d 764 (1985); People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530, 473 N.E.2d 6, 483 N.Y.S.2d
483 (1984).
129. See cases cited supra notes 31-38.
130. Judicial power to fill legislative gaps is viewed either as a form of statutory interpretation or common lawmaking. See CARDozo, supra note 1, at 70 ("In
every case, without exception, it is the business of the court to supply what the
statute omits, but always by means of an interpretive function."); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv.L. REv. 405, 421-22
(1989) (gap-filling is neither an embarrassment nor a usurpation but an inevitable
part of interpretation); see also Daniel R. Rotenberg, CongressionalSilence in the
Supreme Court, 47 U. MiAmi L. REv. 375 (1992) (discussing the various and occasionally inconsistent approaches of the Supreme Court to gap-filling). The
Supreme Court has expressed a general reluctance to draw inferences from Congressional silence, and fills statutory gaps based on doctrinal and policy considerations. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993).
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the judge functioning in a distinctly interpretative mode, which
routinely occurs when the judge finds that a positive rule covers
the subject, and then proceeds to define and apply the rule. The
judge who invokes supervisory power is creating a new rule
based on considerations of justice, fundamental fairness, and
131
civilized standards of decency.
Although the common law approach also may involve fashioning a new rule, either procedural, evidentiary, or substantive, 132 the rule is formulated in the context of adjudicating the
rights of the parties before the court and enables the court to
decide that discrete controversy. For example, judges have formulated procedural rules governing the examination of witnesses 133 and the taking of guilty pleas; 34 evidentiary rules
creating hearsay exceptions 3 5 and testimonial privileges; 3 6 and
substantive rules expanding tort liability. 13 7 Supervisory
power, by contrast, typically has been invoked in situations that
131. Inferior courts that invoke supervisory power are creating a rule for that
particular case. Superior courts, such as the New York Court of Appeals, are formulating a rule for general application by inferior courts to all similar cases. The
term "supervisory power" is therefore more apt when referring to the rulings of
superior courts.
132. See supra notes 119-21.
133. People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 378, 314 N.E.2d 413, 418, 357
N.Y.S.2d 849, 856 (1974) (stating that a court ruling should be guided by "its discretion and in the interests of justice," and should be informed by "the vitality and
sagacity of the common law process").
134. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 243, 318 N.E.2d 784, 795, 360 N.Y.S.2d
623, 638 (1974) (emphasizing the "role of the court in overseeing and supervising
the delicate balancing of public and private interests in the process of plea
bargaining").
135. People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 610. N.E.2d 369, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696
(1993); Fleury v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334, 200 N.E.2d 550, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647
(1964). But see Loschiavo v. Port Authority, 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 448 N.E.2d 1351, 462
N.Y.S.2d 440 (1983) (refusing to change "well-settled, albeit widely criticized"
hearsay rule dealing with an agent's admissions and .deferring such change to
legislature).
136. People v. Ramistella, 306 N.Y. 379, 118 N.E. 566 (1954); People ex rel.
Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936); Bacon v.
Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394 (1880).
137. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
There is no similar common law power with respect to criminal liability. See People v. Fein, 292 N.Y. 10, 14, 53 N.E.2d 374, 376 (1944) ("Long ago in this State'...
the abolition of all common-law crimes was accomplished ..... No act committed
within this jurisdiction is criminal except as prescribed by statute.") (citations
omitted).
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are independent of the actual controversy, such as pre-trial dis40
covery,138 grand jury proceedings, 139 and police investigations.
To be sure, judicial review of such matters may have procedural and evidentiary consequences that can affect the ultimate
disposition of the case. However, the impact of such review
transcends the actual controversy, and imposes behavioral
norms on a coordinate branch of government, in addition to directly affecting the rights of the litigants before the court.
Moreover, whereas a principal purpose of the common law process is to resolve the dispute between the private litigants,'4 '
the dominant purpose of supervisory power is to formulate standards of proper conduct for public officials, typically prosecutors, police, and other law enforcement personnel. 42 Thus, as
Professor Hill observed, judges who exercise supervisory power
"seem to regard the conferring of public benefit as incidental to
withholding judicial favor or protecting the judiciary from unsa143
vory involvement."
138. See infra notes 145-222 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 223-336 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 337-91 and accompanying text.
141. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) ("For after all, the common law is but the accumulated expressions of the various judicial tribunals in
their efforts to ascertain what is right and just between individuals in respect to
private disputes.").
Chancellor James Kent described the common law as "those principles, usages, and rules of action, applicable to the government and security of persons and
property, which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature." 1 JAMEs KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERCAN
LAw 470 (4th ed. 1840).
There are two principal functions of the judicial decision. The first function is
to decide the private controversy. The second function is to declare the law for
future controversies. These functions have a reciprocal influence that recall the
saying that "hard cases make bad law." See Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial
Decision, 36 HARv. L. Rv.940, 940 (1923). When exercising supervisory power, a
judge presumably is aware of this conflict, but, as a matter of justice and sound
public policy, has decided that the function of deciding the particular case is outweighed by the function of articulating standards of proper governmental conduct
for the future.
142. The concept of supervisory power assumes that the court has a special
responsibility when one of the parties is the government. The types of harm that
government can inflict on private citizens is different from the types of harm that
private citizens can inflict on one another, and thus occasions the need for special
prophylactic measures, which is the essence of supervisory power. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 408-09
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
143. Hill, supra note 4, at 207-08.
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V. Application of Supervisory Power in New York
Based on notions of fundamental fairness and justice, and
in the absence of any constitutional or statutory mandate, the
New York courts have resorted to supervisory power in a variety of contexts. The three principal areas in which supervisory
power has been employed involve (1) formulating rules of discovery and inspection; (2) circumscribing prosecutorial conduct
in the grand jury; and (3) fashioning remedies for governmental
misconduct.'"
A. FormulatingRules of Discovery
Discovery is an appropriate subject for judicial supervision.
To the extent that our adversary system is capable of providing
an effective mechanism for arriving at the truth about a controversy, it presupposes the ability of each party to the dispute to
have access to information relevant to the case. 145 However, because of its inherently contentious character, the adversary system often resembles a game of "blind man's bluff"146 rather than
a disinterested search for the truth. 47 To function rationally
and fairly in the face of built-in obstacles to truth, 14 the adversary system requires the intervention of an impartial arbiter to
oversee the process by which the parties attempt to obtain, control, or withhold information relevant to the case. The problems
of information acquisition and retention can become particularly troublesome in criminal litigation, where the prosecutor,
because of his institutional role in the data-gathering process,
has far greater access to information than the defendant, as
144. Other instances of the exercise of supervisory power include, inter alia,
punishment for contempt, In re Douglas v. Adel, 269 N.Y. 144, 199 N.E. 35 (1935),
closure of the courtroom, People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E. 769 (1954), and
protecting jurors from pretrial publicity, People v. Mordino, 58 A.D.2d 197, 396
N.Y.S.2d 737 (4th Dep't 1977).
145. Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 228, 228 (1964).
146. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
147. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution:Sporting Event or Quest for Truth, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279.
148. These obstacles include limited defense resources, statutory and doctrinal rules that restrict a defendant's ability to acquire relevant information about
the case, and prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to the defense. See
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 393, 449-50
(1992).
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well as the ability and incentive to withhold evidence capable of
proving a defendant's innocence. 149 Moreover, criminal discovery has never favored defendants. The traditional resistance to
providing discovery to an accused stems from a fear that it
would create for the accused an unfair advantage, since the
prosecutor could not similarly compel production from the defendant, 5 0 as well as a concern that a defendant would misuse
discovery by tampering with witnesses or suborning perjury.' 5 '
Despite strong resistance, however, criminal discovery has
been marked by a liberalizing trend over the past half century.
Constitutional 152 and statutory 53 rules of discovery and disclosure have made substantial inroads into the limited opportuni54
ties for criminal discovery that existed at common law.
Nevertheless, gaps in the discovery process remain. There
often exists no constitutional or statutory rule to cover these
"gaps," but a compelling argument can be made that nondisclosure will substantially affect, and possibly even distort, the accuracy and fairness of the truth-finding process. 155 It is in these
149. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor'sMisconduct, 23 CRIM.
L. BULL. 550 (1987).
150. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2224, at 219-20 (McNaughton Rev. 1940).
151. See State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1953):
In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that... the
criminal defendant who is informed of the names of all the State's witnesses
may take steps to bribe or frighten them into giving perjured testimony or
into absenting themselves so that they are unavailable to testify. Moreover,
many witnesses, if they know that the defendant will have knowledge of
their names prior to trial, will be reluctant to come forward with information during the investigation of the crime.
Id. at 884 (Vanderbilt, C.J.); see also Edward S. Dennis, Jr., The Discovery Process
in CriminalProsecutions:Toward Fair Trials and Just Verdicts, 68 WASH. U. L.Q.
63 (1990).
152. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (holding that compulsory process clause guarantees defendant right to summon witnesses); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (stating that due process clause requires prosecutor
to disclose exculpatory evidence).
153. See, e.g., FED. R. CRrm. P. 16; N.Y. CRIm. PRoc. LAw § 240.20 (McKinney
1993).
154. See People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84
(1927).
155. See, e.g., Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in
PotentiallyCapital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987) (documenting that 350 innocent persons were convicted of capital murders, that 23 of those persons were executed with 22 narrowly winning reprieves, and that a significant number of these
cases involved claims of prosecutorial suppression of evidence); see also Bennett L.
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situations that the New York courts, through their supervisory
power, have formulated rules of discovery based on principles of
157
"fundamental fairness" 156 and "a right sense of justice."
1.

'A Right Sense of Justice"

As noted above, Lemon recognized an inherent supervisory
power in New York courts to fashion rules of discovery in criminal cases. 5 8 The scope of this power, and the circumstances of
its use, were not identified by the Lemon court. However, Judge
Cardozo's tacit invitation to the judiciary to exercise supervisory power was explicitly accepted by the court six years later in
People v. Walsh. 159 There, a prosecution witness in a murder
case testified that he had been interviewed and had given a
statement to the District Attorney.160 Defense counsel requested the court to compel the prosecutor to produce the statement for use in cross-examination of the witness. 16 ' The trial
court denied defense counsel's request on the ground that no
16 2
rule required production.
The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that in some circumstances, fairness to the accused, 163 and "a right sense ofjusGershman, The Thin Blue Line: Art or Trial in the Fact-FindingProcess?,9 PACE
L. REV. 257 (1989) (discussing a film maker's graphic portrayal of the distorting
effects of prosecutorial misconduct on the fact-finding process in a capital murder
case).
156. See N.Y. CirM. PRoc. LAW § 240.10 commentary at 216 (McKinney 1993).
157. People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883 213 N.Y.S.2d
448, 450 (1961).
158. Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 32, 156 N.E. at 86; see supra notes 75-111 and accompanying text.
159. 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933).
160. Id. at 149, 186 N.E. at 425.
161. Id. Plainly, the context was different than in Lemon; the request for the
statement was made during the trial after the witness had testified, rather than
pretrial, where no particular exigency would have supported disclosure. It thus
could not be argued with the same force as in Lemon that the defense attorney was
embarking on a general fishing expedition rather than seeking documents that,
through impeachment by showing inconsistencies, could materially assist the factfinder in determining the witness's credibility and thereby produce a more just
result. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
162. Walsh, 262 N.Y. at 149, 186 N.E. at 425.
163. Id. at 150, 186 N.E. at 425. "The State has no interest in interposing any
obstacle to the disclosure of the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused
parties on the testimony of untrustworthy persons." Id. (quoting People v. Davis,
18 N.W. 362, 363 (Mich. 1884)).
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tice," 64 require disclosure of such statements. The court thus
created a new rule of discovery: "[W]here a witness in a criminal
case testifies to having made such a statement, and the statement is in court and an inspection of it by the presiding judge
reveals contradictory matter, its use for cross-examination on
the question of credibility may and usually should be permitted."165 The court qualified this holding by conceding to the

prosecutor a limited privilege; where judicial inspection determines that publication would be "prejudicial to the public interest," the statement is protected, and disclosure is
unauthorized.166

The Walsh rule, an early instance of the use of supervisory
power, purported to strike a balance between according fairness
to an accused and protecting the interests of the prosecutor in
having to divulge confidential material. The rule represented a
compromise between the principal goal of supervisory power to
"further[ ] ... justice," 6 7 and a recognition, understood by the
Chancellor and the common law courts, that invoking supervisory power represents a breach in the doctrine of separation of
powers, through judicial intervention into the traditional prerogatives of the prosecutor to withhold confidential documents
168
from disclosure.
Although broadening a defendant's access to relevant information, the Walsh rule may be seen as an uneasy accommodation between promoting justice and usurping power for several
reasons: it disallows inspection unless the judge concludes that
a contradiction appears between the witness's testimony and
the prior statement; it disallows inspection if the prosecutor can
make a sufficient showing of the need for confidentiality; and it
offers a confusing standard to the lower courts as to whether
disclosure is mandated unless the prosecutor can establish
either "strong reasons otherwise," 169 or nondisclosure is required unless the defendant can establish that the statement is
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Walsh, 262 N.Y. at 150, 186 N.E. at 425.
Id. at 149-50, 186 N.E. at 425.
Id. at 150, 186 N.E. at 425.
Lemon, 245 N.Y. at 30-31, 156 N.E. at 85-86.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
Walsh, 262 N.Y. at 150, 186 N.E. at 425.
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"favorable to the defendant" and that "a right sense of justice
170
demands that it should be available."
In any event, despite the absence of legislation, and in a
context that historically resisted the intervention of common
law, the Court of Appeals in Walsh invoked its supervisory
power to produce a rule that represented an important innovation towards more equitable criminal discovery and, ultimately,
a fairer trial. Nonetheless, the decision was apparently a limited one, and in the general context of criminal discovery, seemingly an isolated deviation. 17 ' Indeed, it is difficult to find over
the next several decades any further enunciation of the New
York courts' reliance on supervisory power to formulate additional rules of discovery and inspection. Nevertheless, the New
York courts were presumably aware of important changes taking place in discovery doctrine, both in the federal system and
72
in the rules of sister states.
Most significantly, in a landmark case involving the exercise of its supervisory power, the Supreme Court, in Jencks v.
United States,

73

held that a defendant is entitled to inspect gov-

ernment reports of interviews with witnesses without any need
to establish a preliminary showing that the witness's testimony
is at variance with prior statements given to law enforcement.

74

1 75
It
The Court declared: "Justice requires no less."

reasoned:
170. Id.
171. See sources cited infra note 172.
172. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was passed in 1946,
allowing a defendant, upon a showing of materiality, to inspect a broad array of
documents in the government's possession. See JAMES W. MOoRE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE RuLEs, at 200-01 (1989). Many state court judges, in the exercise of
their discretion, were allowing broad pretrial discovery. See generally Fletcher,
supra note 91. Examples of such instances were: allowing defendants to inspect
confessions previously given to the police, Powell v. Superior Court, 312 P.2d 698
(Cal. 1957), allowing defendants to inspect physical evidence, such as clothing
taken from the victim, DiJoseph Petition, 145 A.2d 187 (Pa. 1958), or weapons or
bullet fragments, State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 275 P.2d 887 (Ariz.
1954), allowing defendants to analyze bloodstains or perform other scientific tests
upon physical evidence in the hands of the police or prosecutor, State ex rel. Sadler
v. Lackey, 319 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957), and allowing defendants to obtain copies of reports of scientific analyses prepared by law enforcement, Walker v.
Superior Court, 317 P.2d 130 (Cal. App. 1957).
173. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
174. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 666.
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The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government
which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice
is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution
and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense ... "176
2.

"Rosario" Rule and JudicialExpansion of Discovery

The new rule fashioned by the Supreme Court in Jencks
was quickly codified by Congress; 177 its impact on New York's
criminal procedure was dramatic. The so-called "Jencks rule"
was adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in 1961 in its

own landmark decision, People v. Rosario.178 The court held

that "a right sense of justice" requires a prosecutor to deliver to
the defense "forthwith" any prior statements of a witness that
relate to the subject matter of the witness's testimony. 179 Discarding the Walsh rule, the court pointed out that contradictions that can be used to discredit a witness "are certainly not
as apparent to the impartial presiding judge as to single175. Id. at 669. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan elaborated upon the
truth-finding interests that are served by allowing defense counsel unimpeded access to a witness's prior statements for whatever impeachment value the attorney
deems appropriate:
Every experienced trial judge and lawyer knows the value for impeaching
purposes of statements of the witness recording the events before time dulls
treacherous memory. Flat contradiction between the witness' testimony
and the version of the events given in his reports is not the only test of
inconsistency. The omission from the reports of facts related at the trial, or
a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of testing the credibility of a witness' trial testimony.
Id. at 667. The Court "disapproved" of the practice, sanctioned by cases such as
Walsh, of directing the trial judge to inspect the documents in advance to determine variance, relevancy, and materiality. Id. at 669.
The Court acknowledged the prosecution's legitimate interest in safeguarding
the privacy of its files, particularly when the documents were obtained in confidence. Id. at 670. However, citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), a
case in which the government also resisted disclosure by relying on the so-called
military secrets privilege, the Court firmly stated that "the Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free."
Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671 (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12).
176. Id.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988).
178. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961).
179. Id. at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
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minded counsel for the accused ... "180 The court did not articulate the source of its power, nor did it refer to Cardozo's theory
of an inherent judicial power to supervise criminal
18 1
prosecutions.
The court's failure to explain the source of its authority to
formulate a rule of criminal discovery highlights the difficulty a
court faces, both doctrinally and prudentially, when it goes beyond the conventional parameters of judicial review.1 2 Perhaps
the court simply assumed that it was functioning in the traditional common law mode and merely revising its prior Walsh
rule. Perhaps the issue of the court's jurisdiction either never
occurred to the litigants or the court, or did not seem especially
important. Or perhaps the court simply decided to obscure the
issue of judicial power in the shadowy rhetoric of justice and
public policy.
To be sure, the court did acknowledge that its ruling "turns
largely on policy considerations" and "a right sense of justice." 18 3
The court also elaborated on the policy considerations, thereby
seeking to demonstrate that its rule was not an aberrant exercise of power but a sound innovation to ensure fair trials.&
180. Id. at 290, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
181. See supra notes 91-111 and accompanying text.
182. Similar doctrinal and prudential concerns are currently dividing the
Court of Appeals as it attempts to formulate appropriate standards for determining when to invoke the State Constitution to provide greater protection of individual rights than those provided by the United States Constitution. Compare People
v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 503, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1346, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 938 (1992)
(Kaye, J., concurring) ("Perhaps more than any other issue, the State constitutional law cases over the past decade have seemed to fracture the Court.") with id.
at 515, 593 N.E.2d at 1354, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (deploring "calamitous consequences in economics and crimes which will be visited on
New York because of the Court's indifference to the jurisprudential and practical
benefits of Federal and State uniformity."). Additionally, compare Judith S. Kaye,
Dual Constitutionalismin Practiceand Principle,61 ST. JoMN's L. REV. 399 (1987)
(advocating state independence in constitutional decision making) with James A.
Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,90 MIcH. L. REV. 761,
763 (1992) (arguing that state constitutional law is a "vast wasteland of confusing,
conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements").
183. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
184. Id. at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450. The court observed
that pretrial statements are valuable not merely as a source of contradictions, but
are useful to demonstrate the witness' bias, or provide the defense with other information to neutralize damaging testimony, stating: "Shades of meaning, stress, additions or omissions may be found which will place the witness' answers upon
direct examination in an entirely different light." Id.
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However, as an instance of the use of supervisory power to further justice, the court did not attempt to explain how the "right
sense of justice" espoused by Walsh several years earlier could
be reconciled with the more expansive "right sense of justice"
85
announced in Rosario.
In subsequent decisions, the court attempted to elaborate
on the rationale for the Rosario rule. In People v. Jackson, s6
the court implied, but never stated as explicitly as Justice
Frankfurter had for the Supreme Court in McNabb v. United
States,1 7 that it has the power to incorporate its notions of justice and fundamental fairness into a formal rule of procedure or
evidence. 188 The court declared that Rosario "is not based on
the Federal or State Constitution. It is, in essence, a discovery
rule, based on a deeply held belief that simple fairness requires
the defendant to be supplied with prosecution reports and statements that could conceivably aid in the defense's cross-examination of prosecution witnesses." 89
Rosario was followed by several cases in which the New
York courts, on an ad hoc basis, broadly extended criminal discovery. Some of these rulings were expressly based on the
courts' exercise of discretion; 90 others were grounded on the
185. Id. The court probably could have done so. It could have explained that
times had changed, and that the concept ofjustice evolves; that criminal discovery
had expanded nationally, and in some contexts even been constitutionalized; that
defense counsel could be trusted to use the information responsibly and not to embark on fishing expeditions; that prosecutors had become more adept at concealing
exculpatory material or increasingly engaging in systematic efforts to thwart the
rights of defendants. The court said none of this; it simply asserted that "upon
further study and reflection," the new rule should be adopted. Id.
186. 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991).
187. 318 U.S. 332 (1943); see supra text accompanying notes 18-26.
188. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 644, 585 N.E.2d at 799-800, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
189. Id. at 644, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487. The court's supervisory authority over Rosario violations also includes situations in which disclosure
has been delayed, or in which the material has been lost or destroyed. Delayed
disclosure requires the court to determine whether the defendant has been substantially prejudiced by the delay. People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56, 63, 503
N.E.2d 1011, 1016, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580, 585 (1986). The court in cases of lost or
destroyed material is empowered to devise appropriate sanctions against the government to remedy the loss. People v. Martinez, 71 N.Y.2d 937, 940, 524 N.E.2d
134, 136, 528 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (1988).
190. People v. White, 40 N.Y.2d 797, 358 N.E.2d 1031, 390 N.Y.S.2d 405
(1976); People v. Remaley, 26 N.Y.2d 427, 259 N.E.2d 901, 311 N.Y.S.2d 473
(1970); People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262, 244 N.E.2d 29, 296 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1968);
People v. Guzman, 79 Misc. 2d 668, 361 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
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courts' exercise of a supervisory authority, 9 1 occasionally refer-

ring to Cardozo's dictum in Lemon. 192 Several of these decisions
predated New York's first discovery statute; the legislature did
not enact a comprehensive discovery law until 1971.193 Other
decisions, notably a decision by the Court of Appeals, 94 formulated rules that enlarged the scope of discovery in detailed ways
that were not provided for by the legislature. Thus, in the absence of legislation, the courts allowed the defense the right to
make independent tests of physical evidence; 195 to examine the
defendant's own statements; 196 to ascertain the identity and
prior statements of witnesses; 197 to inspect hospital records; 198
and to inspect autopsy reports. 199 These rulings can be viewed
either as legitimate expressions of an inherent supervisory
1974); People v. Powell, 49 Misc. 2d 624, 268 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. Richmond
County 1965); People v. Courtney, 40 Misc. 2d 541, 243 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1963); People v. Karpeles, 146 Misc. 2d 53, 549 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Crim.
Ct. Richmond County 1989).
191. People v. Collins, 75 Misc. 2d 535, 348 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Nassau County Ct.
1973); People v. Innes, 69 Misc. 2d 429, 326 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Westchester County Ct.
1971); People v. Seaman, 64 Misc. 2d 684, 315 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk
County 1970); People v. North, 96 Misc. 2d 637, 409 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Amherst Town
Ct. 1978).
192. People v. Courtney, 40 Misc. 2d 541, 543, 243 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1963); People v. Utley, 77 Misc. 2d 86, 97, 353 N.Y.S.2d 301, 315
(Nassau County Ct. 1974); People v. Innes, 69 Misc. 2d 429, 430, 326 N.Y.S.2d 669,
671 (Westchester County Ct. 1971); People v. Preston, 13 Misc. 2d 802, 803-04,
176 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546 (Kings County Ct. 1958).
193. N.Y. CRM. PRoc. LAw § 240 (McKinney 1993). A court has the power to
take "appropriate action" for failure to comply with an order of discovery. Id.
§ 240.70(1) (McKinney 1993). Such action could include dismissal of the charges.
See People v. Szychwlda, 57 N.Y.2d 719, 440 N.E.2d 790, 454 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1982).
194. People v. White, 40 N.Y.2d 797, 358 N.E.2d 1031, 390 N.Y.S.2d 405
(1976) (authorizing pretrial right of defendant to conduct independent tests as to
weight and composition of drugs).
195. People v. White, 40 N.Y.2d 797, 358 N.E.2d 1031, 390 N.Y.S.2d 405
(1976); People v. Karpales, 146 Misc. 2d 53, 549 N.Y.S.2d 903 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
Richmond County 1989).
196. People v. Remaley, 26 N.Y.2d 427, 259 N.E.2d 901, 311 N.Y.S.2d 473
(1970); People v. Utley, 77 Misc. 2d 86, 353 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Nassau County Ct.
1974).
197. People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262, 244 N.E.2d 29, 296 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1968);
In re Aspland v. Judges of the County Court, 42 A.D.2d 930 (2d Dep't 1973); People
v. Guzman, 79 Misc. 2d 668, 361 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1974).
198. People v. Preston, 13 Misc. 2d 802, 176 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Kings County Ct.
1958).
199. People v. Courtney, 40 Misc. 2d 541, 243 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1963).
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power described by Cardozo, 200 or as an exercise of an authority
that is of questionable legitimacy. Interestingly, the cases and
commentary almost always focus on the merits of the rulings,
rather than on the source of the power, or the legitimacy of its
exercise. 201 In short, although grounded upon supervisory
power never specifically articulated, Rosario has been one of the
20 2
most durable decisions of the Court of Appeals.
3.

Mandating,and Restricting, Rule of Automatic
Reversal

In People v. Consolazio,20 3 the Court of Appeals announced
a new rule of appellate reversal for Rosario violations. The
court ruled that harmless-error analysis was inappropriate for
Rosario violations; 2°4 a per se rule of automatic reversal was declared. 20 5 Consolazio is a curious decision. 20 6 The court simply
200. See supra notes 91-111 and accompanying text.
201. The courts occasionally have refused to fill legislative gaps either on the
ground that the legislature intended to cover the field exclusively, or that judicial
intervention would constitute an improper arrogation of judicial power. See, e.g.,
People v. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982) (no
power to take blood samples without court order although no statute specifically
covers the subject).
202. People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610, 615, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 1071, 593
N.Y.S.2d 491, 493 (1992). Rosario has been codified in N.Y. CRlu. PRoc. LAw
§ 240.45(1) (McKinney 1993). In addition to the provisions in Rosario, the statute
also provides for reciprocal discovery by the prosecution of written or recorded
statements by persons other than the defendant. N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAw
§ 240.45(2) (McKinney & Supp. 1993).
203. 40 N.Y.2d 446, 354 N.E.2d 801, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1976).
204. Ironically, the discovery violation in Rosario - the failure of the trial
judge to allow the defense to inspect the prior statements of witnesses - was now
considered harmless under New York's legislatively-mandated harmless error
rule. Code of Criminal Procedure, ch. 442, § 542, 1881 (2) N.Y. Laws 1 (current
version at N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 470.05(1) (McKinney 1993)). The judgment of
conviction and sentence of death in Rosario were affirmed. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at
293, 173 N.E.2d at 885, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 453. Several cases decided shortly after
Rosario also applied the statutory harmless error rule to preserve convictions despite Rosarioviolations. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 10 N.Y.2d 774, 177 N.E.2d
56, 219 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1961).
205. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d at 454, 354 N.E.2d at 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
"We thus reject arguments that consideration of the significance of the content or
substance of a witness' prior statements can result in a finding of harmless error."
Id.
206. The case is commonly cited for the rule that Rosario is not violated when
the prosecutor provides the defense with statements that are the "duplicative
equivalent" of the non-disclosed statements.
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asserted, without analysis or explanation, that the traditional,
statutory harmless error test should be abandoned with regard
20 7
to Rosario violations.
The court did not explain the source of its power to override
the statutory mandate. Only in subsequent opinions did the
court offer a rationale for its adoption of a rule of per se reversal. 208 For example, in one of these subsequent opinions, the
court justified this departure from the Rosario rule on the
ground that it is impossible to quantify, short of outright speculation, the degree of damage that is inflicted on the defendant's
case when defense counsel is deprived of cross-examination material.20 9 In that case, the court recognized the windfall it was
giving to the defense; adopting a per se reversal rule "afforded
the defendant's cross-examination rights even greater protection," even if the prosecutor's violation was inadvertent or the
210
material was trivial.
Apart from its merits, Consolazio is a remarkable example
of judicial power. The court created a prophylactic per se reversal rule, seemingly in contravention of the statutory mandate,
to protect another rule that originally was created not through
the traditional operation of common law-making, but through
the court's exercise of an unacknowledged and unexplained inherent power to achieve justice. Even more remarkable is the
absence of any principled discussion in any of the decisions,
save for a few oblique allusions, of the legitimacy of the exercise
of that power. The court apparently assumed either that its exercise of power was within the bounds of legitimacy, or that
even if its exercise approached the outer edges of those boundaries, the overriding soundness of the result in terms of justice
and public policy would be sufficient to insulate it from attack
for judicial activism and arrogation of power.
Finally, the scope of the court's supervisory power in the
discovery context figured prominently, but silently, in People v.
207. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d at 454, 354 N.E.2d at 805, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 66; see
also N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 470.05(1) (McKinney 1993), which states "[an appellate court must determine an appeal without regard to technical errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
208. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 643-45, 585 N.E.2d 795, 79899, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486-87 (1991).
209. Id. at 643-44, 585 N.E.2d at 798-99, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87.
210. Id. at 644, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
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Jackson.211 There, a majority of four judges of the Court of Appeals declared that Rosario'sper se reversal rule does not apply
to claims raised collaterally pursuant to section 440.10 of New
York's Criminal Procedure Law after the defendant's direct appeals have been exhausted. 212 Once again, the supervisory
power rhetoric of fairness, justice, and public policy permeated
the opinion. 213 However, the debate between the majority and
the three dissenters concerned the soundness and consistency of
the new restrictive rule. 214 This debate, important as it was,

largely obscured the equally fundamental question concerning
the source of the court's power to formulate a discovery rule in
the first place. Rather, the debate focused on the per se rule of
reversal and resulted in the court's adopting a new rule of prejudice for claims raised collaterally after the appellate process
215
was completed.
The majority attempted to place its decision within the
traditional boundaries of the common law process of statutory
interpretation grounded on public policy, but it employed the
rhetoric of supervisory power.216 The majority, it seems, was
trying to strike a balance between a responsible exercise of supervisory power as reflected in the Rosario-Consolaziorule, and
an even broader supervisory ruling that could be attacked as
excessive and irresponsible. It acknowledged that Rosario was
a nonconstitutional exercise of judicial power to achieve justice,
and that the per se reversal rule was a judicial creation to
217
achieve the purposes of Rosario.
Having established Rosario as doctrinally sound, the majority went on to observe that there are statutory as well as prudential limitations that counsel against extending Rosario's per
se reversal rule to collateral attacks. 218 Section 440.10 does not
211. 78 N.Y.2d 638, 585 N.E.2d 795, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1991).
212. Id. at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
213. The words "fair" or "fairness" are used 13 times; the word "policy" 30
times; and the phrase "right sense of justice" four times.
214. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 647-48, 650-51, 585 N.E.2d at 801-04, 578
N.Y.S.2d at 489-92.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 644-45, 585 N.E.2d at 798-99, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87.
218. Id. at 645-46, 585 N.E.2d at 799-800, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487-89. The majority's attempt to justify its result on the basis of statutory construction is questionable. The majority asserted that "the Legislature has already spoken" in requiring
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contain any language specifically dealing with Rosario violations. Notwithstanding the absence of this language, the court
assumed that Rosario claims were most appropriately considered under subsection (1)(f) of section 440.10 dealing with "improper and prejudicial conduct." 219 The court then interpreted
this subsection as containing an explicit legislative requirement
that a petitioner demonstrate prejudice in order to prevail on a
220
Rosario claim.
Of course, when Rosario and Consolazio were decided, the
legislature also required a showing of prejudice before judgments could be reversed on appeal. In the end, justice and policy - the driving forces behind supervisory power - dictated
the result. In Jackson, the compelling societal interest in the
finality of judgments counselled against extending the per se reversal rule to collateral motions. 22 1

As the foregoing discussion reveals, the New York courts
have in fact exercised an inherent supervisory power to formulate discovery rules in criminal cases, but have usually refrained from articulating the precise source of that authority.
The language often appears vague and mysterious; the decisions seem ad hoc and inconsistent. This approach to an exdefendants filing motions under section 440.10 to demonstrate prejudice. Id. at
641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485. The legislature, however, had already spoken in codifying the doctrine of harmless error, which the court overrode
in Consolazio. Moreover, since section 440.10 does not contain any language specifically dealing with Rosario violations, the court could have concluded from that
omission that the legislature intended to exclude Rosario claims from collateral
attack.
Alternatively, the court could have concluded that despite its omission from
the statute, Rosario itself was a common law creation, and therefore the rule and
its per se reversal component would remain intact. The court could have interpreted section 440.10 to cover Rosario violations, but found the prejudice requirement as being inherent in any Rosario violation. This, in essence, is what the
court did in Consolazio. Indeed, this is the interpretation adopted by the dissent in
Jackson. Id. at 653-54, 585 N.E.2d at 798-99, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87. The majority chose none of these options.
219. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 645, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
220. Id. at 646, 585 N.E.2d at 800, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 488. "The statute by its
very terms affords a remedy only if the defendant's trial was affected by conduct
that was both improper and prejudicial." Id.
221. Id. at 649, 585 N.E.2d at 802, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
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tremely important area of judicial authority is attributable to
the nature of the power itself. To the extent that supervisory
power seeks to regulate matters ancillary to the criminal trial,
and without any written guidance contained in either the federal or state constitutions or statutes, it is vulnerable to claims
of judicial activism, unprincipled subjectivism, and a violation
2 22
of separation of powers.
B. Supervising Grand Jury Practice
The relationship between the judiciary and the grand jury
as
is ambiguous at best. Insofar223as the grand jury is viewed
"part of the judicial process,"
or "an arm of the court,"224 it
would seem to be uniquely subject to the court's supervisory
power to enforce proper standards of conduct. However, to the
extent that the grand jury is viewed as an independent investigating agency, and closely affiliated with the executive branch
as represented by the prosecutor, 225 judicial intervention would
seem to violate the principle of separation of powers. Although
the federal courts have lately withdrawn from the broad supervision of grand jury practice they previously exercised, 226 the
New York courts have frequently intervened to supervise the
integrity of the grand jury process, and to ensure that prosecu227
tors behave fairly.
The grand jury is one of the most powerful instruments in
the arsenal of law enforcement. 228 Historically an independent
body standing as a buffer between the citizen and the state, the
grand jury today has many of the hallmarks of a "prosecutorial
222. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
223. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940).
224. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617 (1960).
225. The grand jury has been referred to as "a prosecutorial agency." United
States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1153 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971); accord United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d
459, 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959) (deeming the grand jury "a law
enforcement agency").
226. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 245-336 and accompanying text.
228. See MARIvN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIs, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL (1977). Judge Learned Hand vividly described the grand jury in

the following way: "Save for torture, it would be hard to find a more effective tool of
tyranny than the power of unlimited and unchecked exparte examination." United
States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1953) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954).
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agency,"229 possessing an awesome range of powers, and emphasizing secret interrogation and accusation as opposed to exoneration. 230 In accord with the oft-stated principle that "the public
has a right to every man's evidence," 23 1 the grand jury is empowered to summon any person before it and, subject to modest
constitutional constraints,2 2 to compel that person to disclose
under oath everything he or she knows about the matter under
233
inquiry.
In New York State, the modern grand jury is hedged
with broader constitutional and statutory restrictions than in
the federal system. As a creature of the common law, the
grand jury's pre-statutory powers in New York State have
been described as "vague and unlimited."234 The first state
constitution, ratified in 1777, made no reference to the grand
jury.235 To provide "a clear and well understood definition
229. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. at 1153.
230. See generally Note, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedureand Problems, 9
CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 681 (1973); Note, The Grand Jury an Investigating
Body, 74 HARv. L. REV. 590 (1961).
231. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
232. The Fourth Amendment limits the scope of a grand jury subpoena for
documents to information that is reasonably related to the grand jury's investigation. See generally See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). The Fifth Amendment's guarantee
against self-incrimination often figures prominently in protecting grand jury witnesses. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). However, the privilege may properly be overridden by a
grant of immunity. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
233. The Supreme Court has stated: "[T]he witness is bound not only to attend but to tell what he knows in answer to questions framed for the purpose of
bringing out the truth of the matter under inquiry." Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273, 282 (1919). Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently reinforced the
grand jury's broad powers, disallowing witnesses from challenging questions as
incompetent or irrelevant, or from objecting that the grand jury is exceeding its
authority, "for this is no concern of [the witness]." Id. The Court has held that a
witness has no right to remain silent, United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,
581 (1976) (plurality opinion), nor any right to counsel inside the grand jury room,
Id. at 581, and that the prosecutor has no duty to advise the witness that he or she
may be a target of the investigation. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181
(1977).
234. In re Wood v. Hughes, 9 N.Y.2d 144, 150, 173 N.E.2d 21, 23, 212
N.Y.S.2d 33, 36 (1961) (quoting COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS ON
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,

REPORT TO

N.Y.

STATE LEGISLATURE,

at

115

(1849)).
235. See generally N.Y. CONST. of 1777.
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of [the grand jury's] powers," 236 New York's legislature in
1849 enacted several provisions dealing with grand jury
237
practice.
The state constitution subsequently was amended to add
provisions empowering grand jury action. 23 8 Moreover, to the
extent that the state constitution explicitly declares that the
common law is continued "subject to such alterations as the legislature shall make concerning the same," 239 the detailed and
comprehensive code subsequently enacted with respect to grand
jury procedure "leave[s] no doubt that the Legislature manifested its intention to supplant the common law on the subject
[of grand jury practice]." 240 However, no code can cover every
contingency. Aside from their interpretive responsibilities,
courts are called upon to fill procedural gaps. 24 1 Additionally,
courts may be asked to oversee prosecutorial conduct inside the
grand jury, even though the conduct is not claimed to violate
2 42
specific constitutional or statutory guarantees.
Accordingly, in the absence of statutes specifically covering
the subject, the New York courts have formulated detailed procedural rules for grand jury practice when no specific rule exists.243

The courts have also monitored the prosecutor's conduct

in the grand jury to ensure fairness. 244 The courts predicate
236. COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS ON CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT TO N.Y. STATE LEGISLATURE, at 115 (1849).
237. CODE CRrM. PROC. §§ 223-260.
238. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 states, in relevant part, "[n]o person shall be held
to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime ... unless on indictment of a
grand jury."
239. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 14.
240. Wood, 9 N.Y.2d at 149, 173 N.E.2d at 23, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
241. See supra note 130, and accompanying text. Understandably, the determination of whether a gap exists, or whether the legislature adverted to the issue
being judicially examined, is itself a question of statutory interpretation. As Hart
and Wechsler put it, "statutory interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking on a
spectrum, as specific evidence of legislative advertence to the issue at hand attenuates." See P. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER ON THE-FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (2d ed. 1973). For an illustration of this issue in the context
of the court's exercise of supervisory power, see generally In re Holtzman v.
Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 523 N.E.2d 297, 528 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1988) (holding that a
court has no inherent supervisory power to dismiss criminal charge for failure to
prosecute even though statutory language does not preclude such power.).
242. See discussion infra part V.B.3.
243. See discussion infra part V.B.3.
244. See discussion infra part V.B.3.
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this intervention on two distinct grounds: first, the existence of
statutory language that contemplates some degree of judicial
supervision over grand jury practice, and second, an inherent
authority to ensure fairness in a setting which by its very nature can be arbitrary and oppressive. However, judicial intervention has been erratic and inconsistent, often determined by
the way the particular court perceives the grand jury's role.
This response is not surprising given the grand jury's hybrid
role to charge guilty persons with crimes and to protect innocent persons from unfounded accusations.
1.

OverridingLegislative Will

The New York courts' supervision of grand jury practice occasionally has produced anomalous results, particularly when
the courts are required either to overlook clear statutory mandates, or fill gaps that the legislature left uncovered. An early
decision of the Court of Appeals illustrates this problem. In People v. Glen,245 the court declared that it had the inherent power
to dismiss an indictment on grounds not provided for by statute.
The defendant had moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming
that improper evidence and erroneous legal instructions had
been given to the grand jury.246
The Code of Criminal Procedure set forth only two grounds
for dismissal, 247 neither of which applied, and explicitly stated
that "in no other" circumstances could an indictment be dismissed.248 Lower courts had interpreted this provision differently, some holding that it completely negatived a court's power
to dismiss indictments upon any ground other than those enumerated, 24 9 whereas other courts held that the legislative power
"could not limit or interfere with the inherent power of the
courts to dismiss indictments upon other substantial grounds
[than] those enumerated."25 0
245. 173 N.Y. 395, 66 N.E. 112 (1903).
246. Id. at 398, 66 N.E. at 113-114.
247. Code of Criminal Procedure, ch. 442, § 313, 1881 (2) N.Y. Laws 1, as
amended by Act of May 14, 1897, ch. 427, § 1, 1897 (1) N.Y. Laws 569, 569-70.
248. See Glen, 173 N.Y. at 399, 66 N.E. at 114.
249. See, e.g., People v. Rutherford, 47 A.D. 209, 62 N.Y.S. 224 (3d Dep't
1899); People v. Willis, 23 Misc. 568, 52 N.Y.S. 808 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1898);
People v. Winant, 24 Misc. 361, 53 N.Y.S. 695 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1895).
250. Glen, 173 N.Y. at 399, 66 N.E. at 114.
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The Glen court acknowledged that the legislature had the
"undoubted right to regulate mere matters of procedure." 251
However, courts have an inherent power "to set aside indictments whenever it has been made to appear that they have
been found without evidence, or upon illegal or incompetent testimony."252 The court stated that "[t]his power is based upon
the inherent right and duty of the courts to protect the citizen in
his constitutional prerogatives, and to prevent oppression or
53
persecution."2
The court thus raised the issue, but did not decide, whether
the above statute, as applied, violated the constitutional rights
of the defendant. 254 It found that the acts complained of did not
taint the indictment. 255 The court's assertion that "no legislative enactment can be permitted to deprive the citizen of any of
his constitutional rights"256 is a truism. The court did not explain the nature of the constitutional rights that may have been
implicated, because it spoke in vague and general terms. Nonetheless, Glen may be viewed as one of those early "glimmerings"
of the court's willingness to invoke an inherent supervisory
power that is inspired by constitutional values, but not necessarily required by specific constitutional rules.
2. Gap-Fillingto Prevent Unfairness
Glen plainly presents a more difficult occasion for judicial
intervention than a case in which no statutory provision directly addresses the issue. The latter case poses less of a challenge to judicial legitimacy. The court may choose either to fill
the gap itself, or refrain from intervening on the ground that
this would constitute an encroachment upon the grand jury's
power or the legislature's prerogative. A controversial instance
of judicial intervention is In re Wood v. Hughes,257 an opinion
written by Judge Stanley Fuld in 1961, the same year in which
258
he wrote the opinion in People v. Rosario.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
Id. at 400, 63
Id.
Id.
Id. at 403, 66
Id. at 400, 66
9 N.Y.2d 144,
9 N.Y.2d 286,

N.E. at 114.
N.E. at 115.
N.E. at 114.
173 N.E.2d 21, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961).
173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961).

41

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:41

The issue in Wood was whether a grand jury, whose investigation of misconduct by public officials warranted no indictment, could nevertheless issue a report censuring certain
officials for nonindictable misconduct, despite the fact that no
power to issue such a report was authorized by constitution or
statute.259 According to the majority, the grand jury's historic
function is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
charge a crime. 260 If there is such evidence, the grand jury
ought to find an indictment. If there is no evidence, the grand
jury "must dismiss the charges or remain silent."26 '
The statute governing grand jury conduct contained no language supporting either interpretation. However, considerations of fairness and public policy dictated the result. A grand
jury report, according to the majority, is viewed by the public as
indistinguishable from a formal accusation, and it invites the
same "public condemnation and opprobrium as if [the person]
had been indicted."26 2 That is unfair, the majority suggested,
for such procedure does not afford the accused any of the protections accorded one who is indicted. 26 3 Thus, in the absence of
any explicit constitutional or statutory language authorizing

259. Both the state constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly
authorized grand juries to conduct such inquiries. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The
power of grand juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public officers, and to find indictments or to direct the filing of information in connection
with such inquiries, shall never be suspended or impaired by law.'); Code of Criminal Procedure, ch. 442, § 260, 1881 (2) N.Y. Laws 1, as amended by Act of June 7,
1939, ch. 770, 1939 (1) N.Y. Laws 1823; Act of Mar. 29, 1954, ch. 305, § 6, 1954
N.Y. Laws 935, 956 (renumbering as section 253(2)); Act of Apr. 29, 1955, ch. 864,
§ 4, 1955 N.Y. Laws 2044, 2053.
However, the power to issue reports was not specifically authorized, even
though grand juries had followed this practice for many years. In re Wood, 9
N.Y.2d at 158, 173 NE.2d at 28-29, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (Desmond, C.J., dissenting). The only previous New York appellate court decision on the subject permitted such a report, although most of the courts in other jurisdictions which
considered the matter found "the grand jury report [both] legally unauthorized and
morally obnoxious." Id., 9 N.Y.2d at 155, 173 N.E.2d at 26, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
260. Wood, 9 N.Y.2d at 154, 173 N.E.2d at 26, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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the report, but animated by a spirit of fairness, the court out264
lawed such reports.
The separate dissenting opinions of Chief Judge Charles
Desmond and Judge Charles Froessel contended that history,
tradition, and practice supported the grand jury's power to issue reports on official misconduct. 265 The dissenters pointed to
another of the court's decisions, People v. Stern.26 6 In Stern, the
court upheld, over Fuld's strong dissent, the grand jury's "holdover power" to continue to hear cases well beyond its initial term
and to consider new matters unrelated to the purpose for which
it was initially impaneled. 267 Stern construed the court's supervisory power over grand jury matters quite narrowly: "Traditionally, our courts have afforded the Grand Jury the widest
possible latitude in the exercise of these powers and insisted
that in the absence of a clear constitutional or legislative ex268
pression they may not be curtailed."
Invoking this recent injunction against judicial usurpation
of the grand jury's power, Desmond stated that "judges sit not
to enforce their subjective notions of fairness but to apply the
law."26 9 Froessel acknowledged that vigorous policy arguments
could be made on both sides, and that there may be erring or
misguided grand juries that might abuse their power, 270 and
stated: "The public, too, has rights."27 1 The public sits on the
grand jury, and pays its expenses. 272 The public is entitled to
know the results of investigations into matters of public concern. 273 When a practice has continued for so many years,
264. Grand jury reports are presently authorized by statute subject to judicial
supervision to protect the rights of individuals named in the report. See N.Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 190.85 (McKinney 1993).
265. Wood, 9 N.Y.2d at 156-68, 173 N.E.2d at 27-35, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 41-52.
266. 3 N.Y.2d 658, 148 N.E.2d 400, 171 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
267. As a consequence of Stern, the legislature has curtailed the power of a
grand jury to consider new matters during a period in which its existence has been
extended. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 190.15 (McKinney 1993); see also People v.
Williams, 73 N.Y.2d 84, 535 N.E.2d 275, 538 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1989).
268. Stern, 3 N.Y.2d at 661, 148 N.E.2d at 401, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 267 (citations
omitted).
269. Wood, 9 N.Y.2d at 160, 173 N.E.2d at 30, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 45 (Desmond,
J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 166, 173 N.E.2d at 34, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 50 (Froessel, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 167, 173 N.E.2d at 34, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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Froessel stated, courts "have no right to strike it down - that
must be done by the people themselves directly, or through
274
their duly elected representatives in the Legislature."
3.

FormulatingSubsidiary Rules of Grand Jury
Procedure

A conflict similar to the one in Wood was debated in In re
Morgenthau v. Altman.275 There, a majority of the Court of Appeals upheld an order directing the prosecutor to present his
witnesses first, before permitting the target of the grand jury to
testify. 276 The prosecutor had sought an order prohibiting the
trial judge from interfering with the grand jury's traditional
power to determine what order to call witnesses. 277 Prohibition
was denied by the appellate division, 278 and the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating "[t]he order in which witnesses are
presented before the Grand Jury is a matter of procedure,
within the supervisory jurisdiction of the court .... "

2 79

274. Id. Following Wood, the New York courts have formulated detailed procedural requirements for grand jury practice in the absence of direct statutory authority. The following are illustrative: courts have instructed the district attorney
to establish a prima facie case before calling the defendant as a witness, In re
Morgenthau v. Altman, 58 N.Y.2d 1057, 449 N.E.2d 409, 462 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1983);
directed the district attorney to re-present the case to another grand jury prior to
voting an indictment, People v. Doe, 151 Misc. 2d 829, 574 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1991); allowed a defendant's motion to amend the indictment, People v. Cirillo, 100 Misc. 2d 527, 419 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1979);
resubmitted sua sponte a charge to a second grand jury, People ex rel. Besser v.
Ruthazer, 3 A.D.2d 137, 158 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1st Dep't 1957); People v. Besser, 207
Misc. 692, 140 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1955); and fashioned rules of procedure
for the examination of witnesses and the legal instructions given to the grand jury,
see infra notes 310-336 and accompanying text.
These decisions specifically allude to the courts' inherent power to supervise
the grand jury. To the extent that these decisions recognize and apply the courts'
supervisory authority, they are vulnerable to the charge that the court is arrogating a power that is not clearly judicial, but belongs instead to the grand jury and
the prosecutor.
275. 58 N.Y.2d 1057, 449 N.E.2d 409, 462 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1983).
276. Id. at 1058, 449 N.E.2d at 409, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
277. Id. at 1059, 449 N.E.2d at 410, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 630 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
278. In re Morgenthau v. Altman, 89 A.D.2d 531, 453 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1st Dep't
1982).
279. Morgenthau, 58 N.Y.2d at 1059, 449 N.E.2d at 409, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
Judge Joseph Bellacosa, in his Practice Commentary to Criminal Procedure Law
section 190.25, has questioned whether the court definitively addressed the merits
of the controversy, or merely examined the procedural propriety of issuing the writ
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Judge Richard Simons wrote a forceful dissenting opinion,
accusing the majority of disregarding established law, and
usurping the powers of a coordinate branch of government. 280
He pointed to People v. Sexton, 28 ' where the court ruled that a
grand jury is a separate and independent body free from the
court's restraint as to its methods of procedure "so far as they
are not controlled by statute or immemorial usage having the
force of law."28 2 Sexton stated: "One of the attributes and pow-

ers of this independent existence is to decide when and in what
order witnesses shall be called ....- 283

Simons described the grand jury as performing a governmental function that is "executive in nature, not judicial."2 4 He
acknowledged that courts traditionally have exercised "a general and largely undefined supervisory power over the actions of
the grand jury" for purposes of impaneling the jury, implementing the grand jury's contempt power, and ensuring that the
power of the prosecutor is not abused. 2 5 However, he stated
that "it has never been contended to my knowledge that the
court has any general supervisory power over the procedures
used by the Grand Jury to receive and evaluate evidence." 286
Simons accused the majority of "recast[ing] the very nature of
that body and in the name of 'fairness' mak[ing] the inquiry a
quasi-adversarial and quasi-adjudicative process, something
28 7
that it is not and never was intended to be."

The interplay between the court's supervisory power and
an arguably inconsistent statute is evident in the cases dealing
with the court's power to authorize the defendant to inspect the
transcribed minutes of the grand jury.288 This issue is closely
of prohibition. See N.Y. Cnmi. PRoc. LAw § 190.25 commentary at 49 (McKinney
Supp. 1994) (1983 supplementary practice commentary). The court's forceful
statement quoted in the text would seem to refute the claim that it did not definitively rule on the merits.
280. Morgenthau,58 N.Y.2d at 1060, 449 N.E.2d at 410, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 63031.
281. 187 N.Y. 495, 80 N.E. 396 (1907).
282. Id. at 513, 80 N.E. at 402.
283. Id.
284. Morgenthau, 58 N.Y.2d at 1060, 449 N.E.2d at 410,462 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
285. Id. at 1060-61, 449 N.E.2d at 411, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See cases cited infra notes 294-95.
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related to discovery. 289 As Cardozo noted in Lemon, the common law aversion to pretrial discovery generally did not extend
to the disclosure of grand jury minutes. 290 Indeed, the defendant in Lemon asked for and received apparently without any
resistance the transcripts of the grand jury testimony. 291 Cardozo observed that courts had an inherent power to order inspection of grand jury minutes, 292 and justified this practice in
the interests of accurate pleadings and to enable defendants to
file dismissal motions. Although the common law rules were replaced by legislation, 293 the courts continued to interpret the
practice through a patchwork of inconsistent and confusing
rules.

294

Under the Criminal Procedure Law,295 there is no express

limitation on the power of a court to order physical release of
the grand jury minutes to the defendant, and some courts have
296
exercised their supervisory power by ordering such release.
However, even absent legislation covering the issue directly, the
Court of Appeals construed this omission as a tacit legislative
declaration that physical release is unauthorized. 297 The practice therefore was invalidated as an unwarranted exercise of supervisory authority on a matter over which the legislature had
298
clearly spoken "in unmuted strains."

289. See discussion supra part V.A.
290. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 31, 156 N.E. 84, 86
(1927).
291. Id. at 27, 156 N.E. at 84.
292. Id. at 31, 156 N.E. at 86.
293. See Proskin v. County Court, 30 N.Y.2d 15, 19, 280 N.E.2d 875, 876, 330
N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (1972).
294. Jaffe v. Scheinman, 47 N.Y.2d 188, 193, 390 N.E.2d 1165, 1167, 417
N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (1979). Some courts examined the minutes in camera before
rendering a decision, Id. (citations omitted); other courts allowed the defendant to
receive the minutes, Id. (citations omitted). However, in either case, inspection
was allowed only as an ancillary remedy to a motion to dismiss an indictment, not
a discovery device to assist the defendant in preparing for trial. In re Proskin v.
County Court, 30 N.Y.2d 15, 21, 280 N.E.2d 875, 877, 330 N.Y.S.2d 44, 47 (1972).
295. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 210.30 (McKinney 1993).
296. Jaffe, 47 N.Y.2d at 194, 390 N.E.2d at 1168, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 244 (quoting
Denzer, Practice Commentary, N.Y. CPiM. PRoc. LAw § 210.30).
297. Id.
298. Id.
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4. RestrainingProsecutorialOverreaching
With respect to evidence that prosecutors are required to
present to the grand jury, or legal instructions that prosecutors
are required to give, one would expect a court's supervisory
power to be exercised infrequently. Given the traditional independence of the grand jury, the judiciary's reluctance to impede
that body's investigative function, and the existence of statutes
broadly covering these subjects, 299 judicial intervention would
seem inappropriate. This is particularly so in the absence of
any indication of prosecutorial overreaching.
However, there are occasions when the interest in affording
grand juries wide latitude to investigate crime conflicts with the
interest in ensuring procedural fairness and maintaining the
grand jury's integrity. Courts in such cases more readily invoke
their supervisory authority to monitor the process and check
any unfairness. In marked contrast to the withdrawal of federal supervisory power over prosecutorial conduct in the grand
jury, 300 the New York courts have shown a greater willingness
to prescribe detailed rules governing the interrogation of wit2
nesses 30 1 and the legal instructions given to grand juries.30 It
is difficult to reconcile these cases. Several of them appear to be
ad hoc and represent a particular court's conception of the
proper role of the grand jury and the prosecutor's duty to behave fairly.
A good example of the courts' supervisory power to prevent
unfairness is the judicial response to claims that prosecutors occasionally summon witnesses before grand juries for the illegitimate purpose of trapping them into committing perjury rather
than for the legitimate purpose of seeking the truth.30 3 Several
299. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 190.25 (McKinney 1993) (proceedings and
operations); id. § 190.30 (rules of evidence); id § 190.55 (authority and duties of
prosecutor); id. § 190.40 (witnesses, compulsion of evidence, and immunity).
300. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
301. See infra notes 302-330; see also People v. DiFaliso, 79 N.Y.2d 836, 588
N.E.2d 80, 580 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1992) (trial court's power to participate in grand jury
proceedings to determine competency-of child witness); People v. Thomas, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 1, 1994, at 25, col. 6 (Crim. Ct. Queens County) (trial court's power to
limit evidence that prosecutor can use in grand jury to impeach defendant's
credibility).
302. See infra notes 332-36.
303. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, The Perjury Trap, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
624 (1981).
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of these cases have involved prominent public and political
figures,30 4 which by itself may account for the court's interest in
overseeing the proceedings. The courts in these cases have attempted to fashion coherent and meaningful standards for the
30 5
interrogation of witnesses.
Another instance of judicial supervision relates to the prosecutor's duty to provide the grand jury with exculpatory evidence. Prior to United States v. Williams,3 0 6 it was unclear
whether federal prosecutors had a duty to provide a grand jury
with evidence that would negate guilt.30 7 Under a fairness
model, disclosure would seem to be warranted, for "if the prosecutor does not produce the evidence, no one will."308 It is thus
unfair to allow the grand jury to charge a crime without being
apprised of evidence that would reveal the charge as unfounded.
On the other hand, under a functional model, the grand jury is
304. People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251,385 N.E.2d 1231,413 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1978)
(Justice of Supreme Court of New York); People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d
122 (2d Dep't 1980) (New York attorney); People v. Brust, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 1976,
at 12 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County) (Justice of Supreme Court of New York); People v.
Blumenthal, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 16, 1976, at 7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (Majority Leader
of the New York State Assembly); People v. Monaghan, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 14, 1975, at
8 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (former New York City Police Commissioner).
305. Compare People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 264, 385 N.E.2d 1231, 413 N.Y.S.2d
302 (1978) (finding a perjury trap) with People v. Pomerantz, 46 N.Y.2d 240, 385
N.E.2d 1218, 413 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1978) (finding no perjury trap) and People v.
Schenkman, 46 N.Y.2d 232, 385 N.E.2d 1214, 413 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1978) (finding no
perjury trap).
The results are problematic for two reasons. First, the court's attempt to assess the importance or memorability of the subject matter about which the prosecutor is examining the witness often appears wholly subjective, and probably not a
matter within the court's competence. Second, the court's evaluation of the vigor
with which the prosecutor attempts to stimulate the witness's memory is also
fraught with broad subjectivity and requires a court to divine the prosecutor's motive, not a matter easily susceptible of judicial inquiry.
To insulate his examination from being branded a "perjury trap," prosecutors
apparently must probe with sufficient earnestness to demonstrate that the inquiry
is being conducted in good faith and not in an effort to elicit perjury. Thus, judicial
oversight in this area is well-intentioned, but extremely difficult to implement, and
thus questionable as a matter of judicial policy.
306. 112 S.Ct. 1735 (1992).
307. See Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Present Exculpatory Evidence to an
Investigating Grand Jury, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1514, 1514 (1977).
308. United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 621 (N.D.
Okla. 1977).
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not designed to adjudicate guilt but to bring criminal charges. 30 9
The trial is the adversarial setting for determining the truth.
The Court of Appeals has addressed this issue in two cases.
In People v. Pelchat,310 the court invoked the fairness model to
dismiss an indictment. The prosecutor presented evidence to a
grand jury through a police officer's testimony that the defendant was a participant in drug activity. 311 The defendant
pleaded guilty to the charge, but subsequently learned that the
police officer informed the prosecutor that he had not actually
observed the defendant engage in criminal activity, but had
simply misunderstood the prosecutor's question in the grand
jury.312 Defendant sought to have his guilty plea vacated; the
prosecutor resisted on the ground that he did not seek the indictment by the knowing use of perjured or mistaken
testimony.313

In a unanimous opinion written by Judge Simons, the court
emphasized the prosecutor's "duty of fair dealing" not only at
trial but in pretrial proceedings. 314 The court did not suggest
the extent of such duty, or whether it requires a prosecutor to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. The opinion alluded to cases in which courts recognized their supervisory
3 15
power to dismiss indictments that are based on no evidence,
perjured testimony, 316 hearsay testimony, 317 or evidence obtained by a prosecutor for improper motives. 318 The "cardinal
purpose" of the grand jury, said the court, "is to act as a shield
against prosecutorial excesses and this protection is destroyed
and the integrity of the criminal justice system impaired if a
prosecution may proceed even after the District Attorney learns
that jurisdiction is based upon an empty indictment."3 19 Thus,
the prosecutor violated his duty of fair dealing by allowing pro309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
N.Y.S.2d
319.

Bracy v. United States, 435 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1978).
62 N.Y.2d 97, 464 N.E.2d 447, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1984).
Id. at 100, 464 N.E.2d at 448, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
Id. at 101, 464 N.E.2d at 449, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
Id. at 103, 464 N.E.2d at 450, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
Id. at 104, 464 N.E.2d at 450-51, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83.
People v. Glen, 173 N.Y. 395, 66 N.E. 112 (1903).
United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972).
In re Cunningham v. Nadjari, 39 N.Y.2d 314, 347 N.E.2d 915, 383
590 (1976).
Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d at 108, 464 N.E.2d at 453, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
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ceedings to continue on an indictment that he knew rested
solely on false evidence.
More recently, however, in People v. Mitchell,320 the Court
retreated from the broad language in Pelchat, and suggested
that judges should be more restrained in exercising their supervisory function to dismiss indictments on grounds of
prosecutorial unfairness. 321 The four-judge majority, in an opinion by Judge George Bundy Smith, framed the issue as whether
a prosecutor is required to present to a grand jury exculpatory
statements of a defendant in addition to the inculpatory statements which were submitted. 322 The majority ruled that there
is no duty of disclosure. 323 Three judges, in a strong dissenting
opinion by Judge Vito Titone, argued that the prosecutor's duty
of fairness was violated by the nondisclosure. 324 The majority
opinion adopted a broad functional model. Thus, the majority
argued, the Criminal Procedure Law states that "in general,
where appropriate" the rules of evidence applicable to trials are
also applicable to grand jury proceedings. 325 The defendant's
exculpatory statements were inadmissible hearsay and thus not
required to be submitted. 326 Moreover, the purpose of an indictment is to bring a defendant to trial based on prima facie evidence which, if unexplained, would warrant a conviction. If the
defendant desired to present exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury, she had the right to do So. 3 2 7 In conclusion, the majority
stated, "The People maintain broad discretion in presenting
their case to the Grand Jury and need not seek evidence
favorable to the defendant or present all of their evidence tend328
ing to exculpate the accused."
The dissenters would have invoked a much broader supervisory authority over the proceedings. They accused the majority of ignoring the prosecutor's duty of fair dealing and candor
82 N.Y.2d 509, 626 N.E.2d 630, 605 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1993).
Id. at 514, 626 N.E.2d at 633, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
Id. at 510, 626 N.E.2d at 630, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
Id. at 513, 626 N.E.2d at 633, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
Id. at 515, 626 N.E.2d at 633, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
82 N.Y.2d 509, 626 N.E.2d 630, 605 N.Y.S.2d 655 (referring to N.Y. CrIM.
PRoc. LAw § 190.30(1) (McKinney 1993)).
326. Mitchell, 82 N.Y.2d at 513, 626 N.E.2d at 631-32, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 656-57.
327. Id. at 513-14, 626 N.E.2d at 632-33, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
328. Id. at 515, 626 N.E.2d at 633, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
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recognized in Pelchat, and contended that there was no articulable reason for the prosecutor's nondisclosure.329 Even worse,
said the dissent, by presenting selective portions of defendant's
statements, the prosecutor effectively eliminated from the
grand jury's consideration the exculpatory defense of justification.330 The prosecutor thus presented a "distorted" case
against the defendant, thereby rendering the grand jury process
331
"hopelessly skewed and fatally defective."
Finally, in the absence of statutory guidance, the courts
have formulated detailed rules of procedure governing those defenses about which prosecutors must instruct the grand jury.
These decisions appear rigid and arbitrary; they are rationalized in terms of the functional role of the grand jury. Prior to
People v. Valles,332 several New York courts required prosecutors to submit to grand juries various legal defenses. 333 In Valles, the Court of Appeals adopted a bright line test, requiring
prosecutors to submit only those defenses that have the "poten334
tial for eliminating a needless or unfounded prosecution."
Thus, defenses that result in exoneration - for example, justification, entrapment, or duress - require submission. Defenses in mitigation for example, extreme emotional
disturbance - do not require submission. The court subsequently held in People v. Lancaster335 that the defense of mental
disease or defect need not be submitted, because even though it
may result in exoneration, it does not necessarily eliminate a
needless prosecution, for the defendant may still be required to
undergo further proceedings following such adjudication. 336

329. Id. at 516-19, 626 N.E.2d at 633-36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 659-61.
330. Id. at 519, 626 N.E.2d at 636, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 660-61.
331. Id.
332. 62 N.Y.2d 36, 464 N.E.2d 418, 476 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1984).
333. See, e.g., People v. Rosenbaum, 107 Misc. 2d 501, 435 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup.
Ct. Rockland County 1981) (claim of right as to taking); People v. Karassik, 90
Misc. 2d 839, 396 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977) (entrapment); People
v. McWilliams, 96 Misc. 2d 648, 409 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Nassau County Ct. 1978) (Penal
Law exceptions).
334. Valles, 62 N.Y.2d at 38, 464 N.E.2d at 419, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
335. 69 N.Y.2d 20, 503 N.E.2d 990, 511 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1986).
336. Id. at 27-30, 503 N.E.2d at 994-96, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 563-65.
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In sum, the New York courts have shown a far greater willingness to monitor grand jury proceedings than the federal
courts, and have exercised their authority to formulate detailed
procedural rules to enforce fair standards of practice. The decisions are not required by constitutional doctrine, but are clearly
animated by a recognition - inspired by due process concerns
- that grand juries and prosecutors must conduct themselves
fairly. However, with respect to the grand jury, the courts have
been reticent about explaining the circumstances for invoking
supervisory power, or seeking to provide a coherent rationale
for its exercise. The decisions often are inconsistent, highly
subjective, and do not yield clarifying principles. The courts try
to balance the fairness model with the functional model. However, since both models have a legitimate claim to judicial recognition, it is virtually impossible to determine in advance which
model will serve as the basis for decision.
C. Creating Remedies for Police Misconduct
To the extent that supervisory power could be used to bar
the admission of relevant, but illegally obtained, evidence at
trial, it provides courts with a formidable weapon to protect individual rights. 3 7 To be sure, the traditional justifications for
supervisory power -

deterrence and judicial integrity33 -

are

the same rationales that supported the exclusionary rule of the
339
Fourth Amendment.
However, supervisory power is invoked not to safeguard
rights explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution but to enforce
standards of "civilized justice" that are broader in scope than
those afforded by constitutional or statutory law. Moreover, the
use of supervisory power to formulate rules of discovery or monitor grand jury practice is historically grounded, and ordinarily
does not affect the accuracy of the truth-seeking process.
By contrast, the use of supervisory authority to create an
exclusionary remedy is neither historically grounded, nor necessary to further the reliability of the adjudicatory process. In337. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
339. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The justifications are deterrence;
preservation of judicial integrity; and protecting Fourth Amendment right of privacy, id. at 658, 659, 655-56.
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deed, such a remedy clearly undermines society's interest in
reliable determinations of guilt. The Supreme Court therefore
has cautioned that when formulating an exclusionary remedy
for governmental misconduct, supervisory power "must be spar340
ingly exercised."
1. Fuld-Desmond Debate
The New York courts have exercised supervisory power to
provide an exclusionary remedy for governmental misconduct
even less frequently than they have in the contexts of discovery
and grand jury practice. In People v. Lane,341 decided by the
Court of Appeals only eight months after People v. Rosario, 42 in
which the court reversed a capital conviction on the limited
ground that the prosecutor made a prejudicial closing argument, 343 the majority opinion briefly noted that a delay in the
defendant's arraignment had not rendered his confession
344
inadmissible.
This was the same issue that triggered the supervisory ruling in McNabb.345 In Lane, it formed the battleground for an
unusual debate between Judge Fuld, in a concurring opinion,
and Chief Judge Desmond, in a dissenting opinion. Alluding to
several United States Supreme Court opinions upholding the
"imperative of judicial integrity,"346 Fuld emphasized that principles of justice and fair dealing were at the core of many of New
York's most important common law decisions excluding evidence because of governmental illegality.3 47 Then quoting at
length from McNabb,348 he argued that New York should en340. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963).
341. 10 N.Y.2d 347, 179 N.E.2d 339, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961).
342. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961).
343. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d at 354, 179 N.E.2d at 340, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
344. Id. at 352, 179 N.E.2d at 339-40, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
345. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341-42.
346. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,659 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 222 (1960); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
347. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d at 355-56, 179 N.E.2d at 342, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 201 (Fuld,
J., concurring). Fuld cited People v. Oakley, 9 N.Y.2d 656, 173 N.E.2d 48, 212
N.Y.S.2d 72 (1961), which excluded a confession sworn before a judicial officer,
People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961), which
excluded post-indictment confession, and People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168, 173
N.E.2d 35, 212 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1961), which excluded a withdrawn plea of guilty.
348. 318 U.S. 332, 343-344 (1943).
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force its prompt arraignment statute in the same manner as the
Supreme Court did in McNabb, namely, by suppressing any
349
confession taken during a period of undue delay.
Desmond devoted virtually his entire dissenting opinion
not to support affirmance of the conviction, which he advocated
in only one sentence, 350 but to respond to Fuld's opinion. He
wrote, "I say that the adoption by us of such a new exclusionary
rule of criminal evidence not only is not required by any known
principle of constitutional law or natural law or morals but is a
procedural innovation beyond our power to make."351 Although
Fuld did not dispute the point, Desmond contended that McNabb is neither constitutionally required, nor applicable to the
352
states.
Desmond distinguished the court's common law power "to
revise a court-made rule found by experience not to work satisfactorily" 353 with the creation of a new exclusionary rule. The
admissibility of confessions and the requirement of prompt ar354
raignments are covered in New York by precise statutes;
their violation "does not license us to add new meanings to
them."35 5 Desmond concluded: "No New York court has any
such supervisory power over the administration of criminal jus3 56
tice as is exercised by the United States Supreme Court."
2.

Creation of Sub-ConstitutionalRight of Privacy

There the matter rested for some fifteen years, until the decision by the Court of Appeals in People v. De Bour.3 57 Set
against the backdrop of street encounters between citizens and
police - euphemistically described in Terry v. Ohio35 8 as "stop
and frisk" - De Bour examined whether the police had the
power to approach and question a citizen when neither probable
349. Lane,
J., concurring).
350. Id. at
351. Id.
352. Id. at
353. Id. at

10 N.Y.2d at 356-57, 179 N.E.2d at 342, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 201 (Fuld,
357, 179 N.E.2d at 343, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 203.

359, 179 N.E.2d at 344, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
360, 179 N.E.2d at 344, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
354. N.Y. CriM. Paoc. LAW §§ 165, 395 (McKinney 1961); N.Y. PENAL LAw

§ 1844 (McKinney 1961).
355. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d at 360, 179 N.E.2d at 344, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
356. Id.

357. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976).
358. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968).
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cause nor reasonable suspicion existed to believe that the indi359
vidual was involved in criminal activity.
Judge Wachtler's opinion addressed the more fundamental
question: Whether the court has the power to formulate an exclusionary remedy when the street encounter constituted an undue intrusion into the individual's security and privacy, but did
not infringe on any right protected by the Fourth Amendment.360 The majority concluded that although no constitutional right is implicated when a police officer stops a citizen on
less than "founded suspicion," the "spirit of the Constitution has
been violated and the aggrieved party may invoke the exclusionary rule." 36 1 Noting that the policing function is "highly

susceptible to subconstitutional abuses,"36 2 the court declared
363
that such conduct would be "subject to the greatest scrutiny."

359. Id. at 8.
360. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d at 216-17, 352 N.E.2d at 567-68, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 38081.
361. Id. In People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 590 N.E.2d 204, 581 N.Y.S.2d
619 (1992), then-Chief Judge Wachtler, elaborating on the meaning of DeBour, acknowledged that its decision in DeBour was not constitutionally compelled, id. at
195, 590 N.E.2d at 212, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 627, but was "largely based upon considerations of reasonableness and sound State policy." Id.
The court declined the People's invitation to overrule De Bour on the ground
that the Supreme Court had firmly held that police-initiated encounters falling
short of actual seizures of the individual do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621
(1991). The court observed that DeBour has been a vital part of New York's common law for nearly 20 years and found "no reason to eliminate entirely its oversight of police encounters that fall below the level of Fourth Amendment seizure."
Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 196, 590 N.E.2d at 212, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 627 (emphasis
added).
362. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d at 220, 352 N.E.2d at 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
363. Id. The courts have indeed scrutinized such conduct, and have ordered
the suppression of evidence when police exceeded the limitations established by
DeBour. See People v. Campbell, 160 A-D.2d 363, 554 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1st Dep't
1990); People v. Stephens, 139 A.D.2d 413, 526 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1st Dep't 1988); People v. Ventura, 139 A-D.2d 196, 531 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dep't 1988); People v. Bronston, 113 A.D.2d 627, 497 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1st Dep't 1986); People v. Fripp, 85 A.D.2d
547, 445 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1981); People v. Branch, 54 A.D.2d 90, 387 N.Y.S.2d
581 (1st Dep't 1976); see also Tetreault v. State, 108 A.D.2d 1072, 485 N.Y.S.2d 864
(3d Dep't 1985) (allowing civil damage action against police based on DeBour
violation).
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Remedies for Statutory Violations

De Bour is one of a handful of cases in which the New York
courts even considered invoking supervisory power to fashion
an exclusionary remedy for governmental misconduct. The
courts almost always have refrained from creating such a remedy. One category of cases involves, as in McNabb, the violation
by the police of a statute which results in a defendant's arrest
and the acquisition of evidence incident to that arrest.
Where the police conduct is illegal, but not violative of the
defendant's constitutional rights, as in McNabb, the principal
issue addressed by the courts is whether an exclusionary remedy should be formulated as a sanction for the violation. The
courts have refused to do so unless the violation is sufficiently
flagrant, is committed in bad faith, and involves circumstances
where the interests of deterrence and judicial integrity require
exclusion.
One such case, People v. Dyla,364 provides a useful illustration. The defendant was charged with committing a murder
while on parole. 365 He claimed that his confession to the police
should have been excluded because it was the product of an illegal arrest, the illegality being the absence of a parole violation
warrant as required under the Executive Law.3 6 6 The appellate
division held that "[a]lthough the arrest could be viewed as unauthorized under State law in that no parole violation warrant
had been obtained, it does not follow that the exclusionary rule
should be applied as a remedy for this non-constitutional
367
irregularity."
Acknowledging that precedent existed for the exercise of a
supervisory power to exclude evidence obtained in violation of a
statute but not in violation of the Fourth Amendment,3 68 the
court suggested that the power might be more appropriately invoked where the police conduct was undertaken in bad faith, or
where the statute in question was designed to implement fourth
364. 142 A.D.2d 423, 536 N.Y.S.2d 799 (2d Dep't 1988).
365. Id. at 425, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
366. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-i(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 1993); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 9, § 8004.2 (1993).
367. Dyla, 142 A.D.2d at 429-30, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
368. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581 (1948).
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amendment rights. Neither condition was present, and thus
the court "decline[d] to exercise whatever inherent 'supervisory
power' we may have to nonetheless order suppression."369
Whether a court chooses to exercise its supervisory authority to exclude evidence seems to be principally a question of policy, rather than power. The courts presumably have the power
to exclude evidence, but, as a matter of policy, decline to exercise it. In People v. Dinan,370 in the course of a criminal investigation into illegal gambling, New York police obtained wiretap
evidence, which was admitted at trial.371 The New York State
Constitution 372 and the Code of Criminal Procedure 373 authorized the introduction of such evidence, and the Supreme Court
had held that no constitutional right was thereby infringed. 374
However, wiretapping violated section 605 of the Federal Communications Act,375 and the Supreme Court had also held that
evidence acquired from illegal wiretapping was inadmissible in
federal courts. 376
The issue presented to the New York Court of Appeals was
whether the conceded violation of a federal law should be remedied by imposing an exclusionary rule in state trials. A majority of the court analyzed whether an exclusionary rule should be
read into the federal statute, in much the same fashion that the
Supreme Court read an exclusionary rule into the Fourth
378
Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio377 and Weeks v. United States.
369. Dyla, 142 A.D.2d at 442, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
370. 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1962).
371. Id. at 353, 183 N.E.2d at 689-90, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
372. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 12.
373. N.Y. CRim. PRoc. LAw § 813-a (McKinney 1961).
374. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928).
375. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1989) (formerly 6 U.S.C. § 605 (1934)).
376. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937).
377. 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961) (the exclusionary rule is "an essential part of
the right to privacy"). Whether the exclusionary rule is "an essential part" of the
Fourth Amendment right is a disputed question. In United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974), the Court stated that the exclusionary rule "is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved." According to the court in Dinan, the exclusionary rule of Mapp
was held to be binding on the states "[flor reasons of high governmental policy" and
"to aid in the enforcement of the fundamental law." Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d at 356, 183
N.E.2d at 691, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
378. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The language in Weeks most closely approximating
a constitutionally guaranteed exclusionary remedy states: "[Tihere was involved in
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The majority concluded that no exclusionary remedy was
warranted since the statute "may not possess the sanction of a
constitutional inhibition protecting against fundamental rights
79
granting immunity from unreasonable search and seizure."
The majority also pointed to McNabb as a significant analogy3 80
in that it formulated a non-constitutional exclusionary rule
38
which the Court explicitly said was not binding on the states. '
4.

Choosing ConstitutionalTheory Instead of Invoking
Supervisory Power

New York courts have recognized their power to fashion an
exclusionary remedy even when there is no constitutional requirement. However, when a court discovers an express constitutional basis for the remedy, then a fortiori it need not rely on
its supervisory power. Not surprisingly, due process and supervisory power both have been advanced as alternative theories to
remedy governmental misconduct that violates fundamental
fairness.3 8 2 Faced with this alternative, the Court of Appeals in
the order refusing the application (to return the seized property to the defendant) a
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused." Id. at 398. The court in Dinan
interpreted Weeks as adopting the exclusionary rule not because it was constitutionally required, "but for the reason that the Supreme Court considered it the
most effective means of enforcing the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure." Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d at 356, 183 N.E.2d at 691, 229
N.Y.S.2d at 410.
379. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d at 354-55, 183 N.E.2d at 690, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
380. Id. at 356 n.*, 183 N.E.2d at 691 n.*, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 410 n.*.
381. See Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1951). In Dinan, Judge
Fuld wrote a dissenting opinion which was endorsed, interestingly, by Chief Judge
Desmond, who had criticized Fuld's supervisory power analysis six months earlier
in People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 179 N.E.2d 339, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961). Fuld
declared that the "imperative of judicial integrity" compels the Court to formulate
an exclusionary rule as a matter of New York State law. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d at 357,
183 N.E.2d at 692, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 222 (1960)).
Fuld said: "[Ilt is the very introduction of the wire-tapping evidence in open
court, the very disclosure of the intercepted communication to the jury, which violates the Federal statute and constitutes the Federal crime." Id. Quoting from his
concurring opinion in Lane, Fuld concluded that "the court should give sanction
neither to illegal enforcement of the criminal law nor to the corrosive doctrine that
the end justifies the means." Id. (quoting People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d at 357, 179
N.E.2d at 342, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 202 (Fuld, J., concurring)).
382. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 497 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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People v. Isaacson38 3 chose due process rather than supervisory
power as the basis for dismissing a drug conviction because of
3 4
"inexplicable" and "reprehensible" police conduct. 8
In Isaacson,the police allegedly used threats 'of prosecution
and physical force to compel a heavy drug user to entrap the
defendant into selling drugs. 385 The Fourth Department affirmed the conviction, rejecting the entrapment defense because
the proof showed that the defendant was predisposed to sell
drugs. 38 6 Justice Richard Cardamone, in dissent, argued that
the court's supervisory power over the administration of justice
should be invoked to bar prosecution because of the egregious
police behavior. 3 7 The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction
and dismissed the indictment, but did so not under its supervisory authority, but as a matter of due process under the State
Constitution. The court formulated a four-part test to determine whether the government's conduct reached a sufficient
38 8
level of outrageousness as to violate due process.
One can only speculate about why the court chose to base
the dismissal explicitly on the due process clause of the State
Constitution, rather than under its supervisory authority. In
contrast to Cardamone's dissent in the appellate division, the
Court of Appeals did not even refer to its supervisory power.
However, since both due process and supervisory power are doctrinal means to achieve fundamental fairness, there would ap383. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
384. Id. at 514, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
385. People v. Isaacson, 56 A.D.2d 220, 226-27, 392 N.Y.S.2d 157, 162 (4th
Dep't 1977).
386. Id. at 225, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
387. Id. at 231, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 165 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
388. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d at 521, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719. The
four factors are:
(1) whether the police manufactured a crime which otherwise would not
likely have occurred, or merely involved themselves in an ongoing criminal
enterprise; (2) whether the police themselves engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice; (3) whether the defendant's
reluctance to commit the crime is overcome by appeals to humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past friendship, by temptation of exorbitant
gain, or by persistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness; and (4)
whether the record reveals simply a desire to obtain a conviction with no
reading that the police motive is to prevent further crime or protect the
populace.
Id. (citations omitted).
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pear to be some measure of overlap, as Justice Brennan
suggested in his dissent in Hampton v. United States.3 8 9 However, there are significant differences between employing due
process or supervisory power to limit law enforcement power.
To the extent that supervisory power authorizes judicial
remedies for governmental misconduct that are not constitutionally required, the decision is conditional, and presumably
can be overridden by the legislature; a constitutionally-based
remedy is not subject to legislative overrule. Additionally, a
constitutionally-based decision represents a much more powerful judicial condemnation of governmental conduct that violates
individual rights than a ruling based on supervisory power.
Further, invoking supervisory power in Isaacson presumably
would protect the integrity of the judicial process and serve as a
deterrent to official misconduct. It would not create a right that
is legally enforceable under the Constitution. A constitutionally-based decision would create a constitutionally enforceable
right.
Finally, courts are probably more comfortable, and less vulnerable to criticism based on separation of powers grounds, in
formulating rights within the traditional parameters of constitutional interpretation than in devising new remedies outside
those familiar and well-accepted boundaries.3 9 0 The Fuld39
Desmond debate in People v. Lane underscores this point. '
From the standpoint of judicial legitimacy, therefore, predicating a decision such as Isaacson on due process rather than supervisory power may be doctrinally more acceptable, and
prudentially much safer. This is not to say, however, that supervisory authority lacks legitimacy, either doctrinally or as a
matter of sound judicial policy. That is the subject of the next
section.

389. 425 U.S. 484, 497 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
390. This is not to say that courts are immune from criticism when they invoke the elastic protections of due process. See Ely, supra note 15, at 949 (criticizing the Court for formulating a due process principle that "lacks connection with
any value the Constitution marks as special").
391. See supra notes 341-56 and accompanying text.
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Legitimacy of Supervisory Power in New York

Despite recent decisions of the Supreme Court restricting
its scope, supervisory power is a familiar and accessible doctrine in the federal courts.3 92 The New York courts, by contrast,
have been more restrained about invoking their supervisory authority, and have been much less forthright about acknowledging that such an authority even exists.3 93 Cardozo understood
the potency and volatility of a supervisory authority over criminal prosecutions; he deferred for future consideration the occasions for its exercise. 394 Strong judges, particularly Fuld and
Wachtler, accepted Cardozo's invitation and invoked the court's
supervisory authority in notable cases. Most often, however,
supervisory power has been a relatively dormant doctrine in
395
New York.
The judiciary's traditional reluctance to exercise supervisory authority is attributable in large part to a conception of our
governmental structure in which the judiciary is disabled from
exercising authority that is neither textually based nor within
the traditional parameters of the common lawmaking process.
According to this view, supervisory power is an unprincipled
doctrine that affords judges a general license to roam about and
invent rules in accordance with the judge's subjective evalua3
tion of what is "good" or "beautiful." 9
As demonstrated above, supervisory power is neither an arbitrary nor unprincipled source of power; it is an expression of
an inherent judicial authority that arises from two distinct and
legitimate judicial concerns. First, to the extent that supervisory power seeks to promote justice and fair dealing, it draws
its inspiration and authority from constitutional principles and
values.397 Second, supervisory power is firmly rooted in the in392. See discussion supra part II.
393. See discussion supra part V.
394. See supra text accompanying note 10.
395. See discussion supra part V.
396. See CARDozo, supra note 1, at 141.
397. American courts, both federal and state, historically have been the principal protectors of fundamental rights and liberties. Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 636 (1886) (describing the Court's historic function "to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon"); see Wachtler, supra note 123, at 7 ("There can be no doubt that today the
orthodox view is that the courts, led by the Supreme Court, are the principal archi-
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herent power of common law courts to mold and revise substantive, procedural, and remedial rules based on evolving
considerations of justice and sound public policy. 398

A.

ConstitutionalJustificationsfor Supervisory Power
The process of constitutional interpretation has evolved
into a well-established judicial practice. Marbury v. Madison399
is the classic pronouncement that a court's constitutional interpretations are authoritative and final. 400 Chief Justice Marshall's assertion is not self-evident, however, and there is no
explicit constitutional authority for the doctrine of judicial review. Indeed, there are few areas of the law as controversial as
the authority of judges to develop new constitutional
401
doctrine.
Nevertheless, despite charges of undue judicial activism in
discovering new rights in such vague constitutional clauses as
tects of constitutional law and the primary protectors of fundamental human
rights."); see also A. S. Zuckerman, Miscarriageof Justice and JudicialResponsibility, 1991 CRIM. L. REv. 492 (judicial function to promote fairness in the administration of justice). Majoritarian institutions such as the executive and legislative
branches reflect a popular will that can be hostile, or indifferent, to individual
rights. This tendency is most noticeable in criminal cases, but is also quite evident
in other areas, particularly with respect to first amendment and equal protection
guarantees.
Thus, in the absence of, or in opposition to, executive or legislative action that
fails to protect individual rights guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions,
the courts are charged with the ultimate responsibility of interpreting constitutional and statutory rules to ensure that those protections are enforced. Moreover,
judicial review has become such an integral part of our governmental order that
the other branches of government routinely defer to the courts for protecting fundamental rights and liberties.
398. See discussion supra part IV.
399. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
400. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 115 (1885) ("the power which courts possess to
condemn legislative acts which are in conflict with the supreme law should be exercised with great caution and even with reluctance"). Acts of the Legislature enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d 604, 607,
563 N.E.2d 705, 706, 562 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (1990). For a recent decision invalidating on constitutional grounds an act of the legislature, see State Bankers Ass'n v.
Wetzler, 81 N.Y.2d 98, 612 N.E.2d 294, 595 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1993), which struck
down audit fee provisions of the 1990-91 state operations bill as violative of article
VII of the New York State Constitution.
401. See supra note 15. This process has become even more contentious in
New York recently as judges are increasingly developing a body of state constitutional law that frequently is in conflict with Federal Constitutional doctrine. See
supra note 182.
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due process and equal protection, and claims of judicial usurpation of the lawmaking function entrusted to the legislative
branch, constitutional interpretation to protect fundamental
rights is a settled part of our legal culture.
It is in the context of interpreting constitutional guarantees
that a principled basis for supervisory power can be discovered.
An examination of the case law in which supervisory power has
been exercised reflects the traditional common law process operating to create, in effect, a body of sub-constitutional judgemade law rooted in principles of justice and fair dealing. The
cases typically draw their authority and inspiration from constitutional values, rather than from the actual constitutional text.
As Judge Wachtler recognized in People v. DeBour, the decisions are grounded in the "spirit of the Constitution,"4 2 and are
legitimated based on the function that courts traditionally have
served as guardians of individual rights. 403 The types of cases
in which the courts have invoked their supervisory power reflect this function.
Thus, to the extent that criminal discovery protects values
that inhere in the right to confrontation, the right to effective
representation, and the right to a fair trial, the court's use of its
supervisory authority to formulate rules to protect these rights,
although not explicitly required by the Constitution, is necessary to protect these rights. This theory easily explains the Rosario rule.
Allowing the defense to have access to a witness's prior
statements to impeach his credibility is more than a technical
rule of criminal discovery. As the Supreme Court suggested in
Jencks v. United States,4°4 it is a quasi-constitutional rule to
protect the defendant's right to confrontation and his due process right to a fair trial.405 Indeed, "a right sense of justice" is a
short-hand articulation of the constitutional values that inhere
in our adversary system. These values require judicial oversight to ensure that the prosecutor's broad powers are not mis402. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 217, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567-68, 386
N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1976).
403. See supra note 397.
404. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
405. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-363 (1959) ("[Ilt would
be idle to say that the commands of the Constitution were not close to the surface
of the [Jencks] decision") (Brennan, J., concurring).
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used, and that the criminal process does not become skewed too
strongly in favor of the government. 4 6 The goals of deterring
prosecutorial overreaching and protecting courts from being accomplices in a miscarriage of justice - the traditional interests
served by supervisory power - amply justify this exercise of
40 7
judicial authority.
Supervisory power is also constitutionally inspired in the
context of the grand jury. The grand jury's authority derives
from the constitution, and its power is constrained by very few
constitutional limitations. 408 The privilege against self-incrimination and the right to a fair and unbiased grand jury are two
such constitutionally-based protections. However, these protections are not self-executing. Because of the institutionalized
power of the grand jury and the prosecutor, the secrecy of the
proceedings, and the limited ability of witnesses to challenge
excesses of power, the courts have exercised a broad oversight
to ensure that prosecutors carry out their functions fairly and
40 9
responsibly.
Thus, notwithstanding extensive and detailed statutory
rules regulating grand jury procedure, and in the face of a traditional reluctance to interfere with the grand jury's independence, the courts have formulated additional procedural rules
to limit prosecutorial and grand jury excesses. 410 This power is
inspired by constitutional limitations that are derived from,
although not mandated by, due process, as well as the privilege
against self-incrimination. 411 People v. Pelchat'sformulation of
a prosecutorial "duty of fair dealing" is one instance of a constitutionally inspired principle that is enforced through the court's
supervisory authority. 41 2 The perjury-trap cases are another
41 3
example of this power.
406. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance ofAdvantage in CriminalProcedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1199 (1960) (describing the "subtle
erosion of the accusatorial system").
407. See supra notes 18-38, 299-336 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
409. See discussion supra part V.B.
410. See discussion supra part V.B.
411. See discussion supra part V.C.2.
412. See supra notes 310-19 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, although the courts claim authority in such instances, they do not necessarily claim finality. The dynamics of
judicial review in a constitutional democracy is operative. In
the absence of a constitutionally mandated rule, the legislature
could override the court's decision and promulgate a statute
changing or modifying any non-constitutional decision.
The most problematic instance of supervisory power is the
creation of remedial rules for non-constitutional violations by
government officials. Courts in such instances invoke their authority to oversee conduct of a coordinate branch, and formulate
remedies for misconduct that are not constitutionally required.
Courts are most vulnerable in these instance to claims of usurpation of authority.
Absent a constitutional basis, courts can be viewed as intruding into the sovereignty of a co-equal branch, inventing
rules based on subjective feelings of outrage, and fashioning
remedies that disallow evidence probative of a defendant's guilt.
However, to the extent that the remedy is seen as necessary to
protect constitutionally-based values such as privacy and personal integrity - the kinds of values articulated in People v.
DeBour - the court's authority is grounded in a judicial tradition that requires a party who seeks the court's assistance to
414
demonstrate "clean hands."
B.

Inherent Judicial Power as Justificationfor Supervisory
Power

Apart from a constitutional basis, supervisory power is also
legitimized as an integral part of the court's inherent power.
The justifications for the court's inherent power provide similar
support for supervisory power. As with supervisory power, the
concept of inherent power is "not susceptible of precise definition."4 15 As such, it "continues to be a vexing problem."4 16 More414. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483 (1928) ("The governing
principle has long been settled. It is that a court will not redress a wrong when he
who invokes its aid has unclean hands.") (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
415. Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 451, 489 N.Y.S.2d 914, 920 (2d
Dep't 1985); see JAMs R. CAmUoAN, INHERENT PowERs op THE CouRTs 2 (1973):
Under the inherent powers doctrine a court has all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions
effective. These powers are inherent in the sense that they exist because
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over, the judiciary's uncertainty and hesitancy with respect to
supervisory power is closely mirrored in the judiciary's ambivalence over the nature and scope of inherent power. Nevertheless, despite its vague and elastic boundaries, inherent power is
a firmly established doctrine in the history and custom of judicial administration and lawmaking, and provides a coherent ra4 17
tionale for the use of supervisory power.
Inherent judicial power has been recognized in a variety of
contexts. Principal occasions for its use have included regulating the legal profession, 4 18 enforcing courtroom discipline, 41 9 ad420
ministering housekeeping details and court schedules,
protecting the integrity of court records, 42' assuring adequate
funding and facilities, 422 and promulgating rules "which are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of their jurisdiction." 42- This latter aspect of inherent
power is analytically similar to the common law power of courts
to fashion substantive rules governing the merits of a controversy, procedural rules concerning the conduct of the lawsuit,
and evidentiary rules concerning the manner in which the merits of the controversy may be proved. 424 It is this traditional
common law aspect of inherent power that is closely intertwined with the concept of supervisory power. 425 To the extent
that both the general common law power and the supervisory
the court exists; the court is, therefore, it has the powers reasonably required to act as an efficient court. Inherent judicial powers derive not from
legislative grant or specific constitutional provision, but from the fact it is a
court which has been created, and to be a court requires certain incidental
powers in the nature of things.
Id.
416. In re Kisloff v. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445, 450, 539 N.E.2d 565, 568, 541
N.Y.S.2d 737, 740 (1989).
417. See discussion supra part II.
418. See supra note 114.
419. See supra notes 119-22.
420. See supra note 118.
421. See supra note 117.
422. See supra note 115.
423. Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 449-50, 489 N.Y.S.2d 914, 918
(2d Dep't 1985).
424. See Michael M. Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress
Did Not Write into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEx. L. REV. 167, 181-82
(1979).
425. The courts frequently refer to inherent power when they are analyzing
the appropriateness of the exercise of supervisory power. See United States v.
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power formulate rules not required by textual sources such as a
constitution or a statute, they are guided by similar considerations, and operate in the same manner. Moreover, they also
share the same temporal or conditional status, in that such
rules can be revised by the legislature. 426 Supervisory power is
analytically distinct from the common law rule-making power,
however, in that its exercise ordinarily is not indispensable to
deciding the merits of the controversy; it is an attribute of the
427
inherent judicial power to administer justice.
The place of common law in today's legal topography is relevant to understanding the role of inherent power generally.
Notwithstanding the continuing vitality of judge-made law,
courts and commentators view lawmaking today essentially as
a legislative function.42 This, of course, was not always the
case. There were courts before there were legislatures. Without the aid of statutes, the courts breathed life into the earlier
4 29
legal systems by formulating rules on a case by case basis.
This power was understood as inherent in the judicial office. It
was necessary to determine the rights between individuals concerning private controversies.
For a variety of reasons - historical, institutional, and
4 30
pragmatic - codes were enacted to displace the common law.
The extent to which the judiciary retained the power to change,
modify, or supplement law in the face of legislation used to be a
much more contentious subject than it is today. 43 1 The modern
legislature is understood as the preeminent lawmaking authority,4 3 2 with courts retaining their classic common law power to
interpret constitutional and statutory law, and in the absence of
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975) (describing federal courts' supervisory power as
an "inherent power").
426. CALABREsI, supra note 123, at 92-93.
427. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
428. CALABREsi, supra note 123, at 2 ("What we are dealing with is the slow
adaptation of our whole legal-political system to a major change: the preponderance of statutory law.").
429. See generally Thayer, supra note 124.
430. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 391 et seq.
(1985); CHARLEs M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT (1981).
431. See supra notes 121-143, and accompanying text.
432. CALABREsI, supra note 123, at 1.
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a legislative scheme that addresses the subject, to fill the
gaps.

433

The extent to which a court invokes its authority to fill
these gaps, particularly when necessary to protect fundamental
values, epitomizes the legislative-judicial dynamic most forcefully. The court's inherent authority in such instances is clear;
whether the court chooses to exercise that authority involves
prudential concerns.
There are several theories that justify a court's inherent
power. Under an instrumentalist theory of inherent power, a
court requires those powers that are necessary to enable the
court to function effectively as a court and to administer justice
in the action. 434 This would include promulgating rules for
courtroom order and decorum; ensuring that there are adequate
facilities for litigants, witnesses, and jurors; establishing rules
for the prompt and efficient disposition of cases; and formulating case-related rules so that the proceedings are conducted
fairly and the merits of the controversy are resolved in accordance with justice.
A second theory of inherent power suggests that all judicial
power in a democracy originally is delegated from the legislature and functions under a conditional grant from the legislature which can be revoked at will. Chief Justice Marshall put
the case as follows:
Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the
laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the
law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in
discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is
never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the
Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the
435
Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.

To the extent that the legislature does not itself enact positive
rules to protect individual rights or the conduct of the criminal
process, there is an implied grant of authority to courts to formulate rules to achieve those goals.
433. See supra notes 257-74 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
435. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824).
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A third theory posits that judges, by training, experience,
and independence, are strategically and temperamentally wellsuited to identify and implement social values whenever the
written law does not provide an answer. 436 To be sure, this theory has a paternalistic quality; it assumes that judges are wise
persons who will do what is right simply by following their instincts. However, there is no institutional mechanism save the
judiciary to identify and implement values that protect the efficiency and fairness of the judicial process and constrain governmental conduct that violates individual rights.
The above theories explain the legitimacy of supervisory
power in the same manner that they explain the legitimacy of
inherent judicial power generally. Under an instrumentalist
view, a court must have the authority to function as a court in
order to inspire the respect and confidence of the public and the
litigants. To perform such a role a court must have the authority to ensure that its processes are not abused, that evidence is
not tainted, and that attorneys, litigants, and witnesses conduct
themselves honorably and professionally.
Under a delegation theory, absent a positive legislative pronouncement, a court possesses an implied grant of power to supervise through rule-making the conduct of criminal
proceedings to achieve fairness and justice. Such authority is
conditional, and remains intact until the legislature chooses to
displace the judge-made rule. And assuming that the legislative displacement is consistent with constitutional principles,
the court would then lack power to change the rule, although it
would necessarily be empowered to interpret the rule. Finally,
the third approach authorizes a judge, based on her background, independence, and sensitivity, to shape the legal fabric
to reflect her conception of the fundamental values that underlie criminal proceedings. This is a role inherent in judging, and
historically has been assumed by common law judges.
VII.

Conclusion

As an established doctrine, supervisory power is alive, but
with a guarded prognosis, in the federal courts. Its existence in
New York has never been clearly established. The courts occa436. CALABREsI, supra note 123, at 95-96; Wachtler, supra note 123, at 11-12.
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sionally invoke its authority, either expressly or as an implicit
expression of their inherent power to achieve justice, but the
doctrine remains shadowy and mysterious. There seems little
doubt that New York courts have the power to supervise in various settings the processes of criminal justice and the conduct of
law enforcement officials, and occasionally have exercised that
power.
Whether that power is legitimate is a matter of dispute.
This Article has attempted to provide principled arguments
based on constitutional, historical, institutional, and moral
grounds that serve to legitimate supervisory power. In the end,
as Cardozo intimated in People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court,
the issue is not one of judicial power but of judicial policy.
Whether a court chooses to exercise that power depends on the
character, temperment, and vision of the judges.
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